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DAVID COWAN BAYNE, S.J.*
The serious errors perpetuated by Ginsburg's O'Hagan warrant
the ready prediction that the Supreme Court will soon revisit the law
of Insider Trading toward cleaning up the mess.
- Bayne, Insider Trading: The Misappropriation
Theory Ignored: Ginsburg's O'Hagan 84 (1998).'
Justice Ginsburg, as ineptly as she did handle O'Hagan,2 is not to
be too harshly criticized. She was, after all, a victim, the inheritor of
fifteen years of serious maltreatment of the law of Insider Trading at the
hands of both courts and commentators.
Try as she might, however, her O'Hagan has done nothing to put
the law back on a rational basis. Rather, O'Hagan failed to exterminate
the Misappropriation Theory - the forceful objective of the Circuit
below - and confirmed as well all the old fallacies of the recent past.
In short, the law of Insider Trading is right where Justice Ginsburg
found it. With a few flaws of her own thrown in.
Interjectory Foreword
Before another word is written, the ultimate goal of the present
endeavor must be explicitly stated. This work must be placed in context,
and its broadest conclusions succinctly previewed.
This Article will complete a two-part Study of O'Hagan, the latest
Supreme Court word on the law of Insider Trading.'
* Professor Emeritus of Law, University of Iowa College of Law.
1. David Cowan Bayne, S.J., Insider Trading: The Misappropriation Theory Ignored:
Ginsburg's O'Hagan, 53 U. MiAmi L. REv. 1 (1998).
2. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997), reversing United States v. O'Hagan, 92
F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
3. As Justice Ginsburg, author of the O'Hagan opinion noted, 'Twice before we have been
presented with the question whether criminal liability for violation of § 10(b) may be based on a
misappropriation theory." O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 650 n.4. She then points out that both times the
Court "declined to address the question," evidently preferring to rule on the perceived inequities in
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The First Part: The Misappropriation Theory Ignored
O'Hagan was expected to adjudicate the legitimacy of the so-called
Misappropriation Theory, a recent attempt to interpret the 60-year-old
Section 10(b).4
For seventy years the Insider Trade had a simple meaning: The
Insider could be any Tom, Dick or Harry who deceives his fellow trader,
using inside information, in a stock transaction.
In the early 80s the Misappropriation Theory appeared, and argued
that the Insider Trade should consist of the Theft of Information in a
breach of a Fiduciary Duty to the Source of the Informnation. The infor-
mation did have to have some unrelated, unspecified use in connection
with a security trade. But the Theory required no duty to, deception of,
or harm to, any Investor.
In its analysis of the transformation of the Insider Trade to a Theft
of Information, the first half of this two-part Study - "Insider Trading:
The Misappropriation Theory Ignored: Ginsburg's O'Hagan."5
reached an unsettling conclusion: That the Supreme Court never judi-
cially faced the question before it: Does the Misappropriation Theory
conform to Section 10(b)?
To the contrary, that Article found "that Justice Ginsburg and the
Majority disported themselves in a lengthy obiter disquisition on 'a
novel New Theory"'6 But finessed the Misappropriation Theory itself.
The Second Part: Insider Trading Ignored
This second half of the Study has reached an equally unsettling
conclusion: That the Supreme Court in O'Hagan, (1) Abandoned all
Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) and Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19
(1987). Id.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994).
5. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory Ignored, supra note 1. These two Articles are the latest
of nine in a growing series of this author's explorations toward a hardcover volume on the current
state of Insider Trading law. The reader is referred to: David Cowan Bayne, S.J., Insider
Trading: The Demise of the Misappropriation Theory - and Thereafter, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 625
(1997); David Cowan Bayne, S.J., The Insider's Natural-Law Duty: The Awakening, 30 Loy. L.A.
L. REV. 487 (1997); David Cowan Bayne, S.J., The Insider's Natural-Law Duty: Chestman and
the 'Misappropriation Theory,' 43 U. KAN. L. REV. 79 (1994); David Cowan Bayne, S.J., The
Insider's Natural-Law Duty: Dirks, the Son of Chiarella, 19 J. CORP. L. 729 (1994); David Cowan
Bayne, S.J., The Insider's Natural-Law Duty: Chiarella and the 'Fiduciary' Fallacy, 19 J. CORP.
L. 683 (1994); David Cowan Bayne, S.J., The Insider's Natural-Law Duty: 'Disclose or
Abstain?', 42 U. KAN. L. REv. 75 (1993); David Cowan Bayne, S.J., Insider Trading: The
Essence of the Insider's Duty, 41 U. KAN. L. REv. 315 (1992).




judicial consideration of Insider Trading, and (2) Substituted Theft, an
ancient crime, in its place.
Patently, with both the Misappropriation Theory and Insider Trad-
ing stripped from the Opinion, O'Hagan is left virtually denuded, with
its only content some obiter reflections as guides for the future.
Background and Perspective
Any Supreme Court opinion demands attention. But an opinion
attempting to resolve a 3-2 conflict in the Circuits has heightened signif-
icance.7 Add to that the intrinsic magnitude of the Insider Trading prob-
lem, and O'Hagan takes on an importance worthy of intense scrutiny.
The exact scope of this intense scrutiny, however, must be sharply
delineated.
Begin this delineation with a broad overview of Ginsburg's
O'Hagan. What is left among the ruins? What deserves comment?
Two points emerge: (i) Justice Thomas Was Correct: The Misappropri-
ation Theory Was Ignored and (ii) Many Fallacies Remain in the Ruins.
The Misappropriation Theory Ignored
The split in the Circuits had presented Justice Ginsburg with only
one assignment. In her own words, this was her objective:
We address . . . the Court of Appeals' reversal of O'Hagan's
convictions under § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. Following the Fourth Cir-
cuit's lead.. ., the Eighth Circuit rejected the misappropriation the-
ory as a basis for § 10(b) liability.
8
Thus, a lone question faced Justice Ginsburg: Could the Supreme
Court hold, contrary to the dissenting Circuits, "[T/hat criminal liability
under § 10(b) may be predicated on the misappropriation theory"?9
Her failure to answer this question was summed up by Justice Thomas,
speaking for himself, Justice Scalia and the Chief Justice:
Because we have no regulation squarely setting forth ... the
misappropriation theory as the Commission's interpretation of
[Section 10(b)], we are left with... the majority's completely novel
7. The Second Circuit, progenitor of the Misappropriation Theory in United States v.
Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004 (1992), had been joined by
the Seventh Circuit in SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071
(1992) and the Ninth Circuit in SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990). In 1995, the Fourth
Circuit broke ranks in United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995), which was followed by
the Eighth Circuit in United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996), rev'd and remanded,
521 U.S. 642 (1997).
8. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 649-50 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at 650.
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theory that is not even acknowledged, much less adopted, by the
Commission. . . . That position . . . can form no basis for
liability. 1"
[The Ginsburg Majority] engages in the "imaginative" exercise of
constructing its own misappropriation theory from whole cloth.1
Whether the ... new theory has merit we cannot possibly tell on
the record before us ... because, until today, the theory has never
existed. In short, the ... new theory is simply not presented in this
case, and cannot form the basis for upholding [James Herman
O'Hagan's] convictions. 12
The three dissenting Justices, led by Justice Thomas, were abso-
lutely right. Justice Ginsburg wandered off into a discussion of her own
New Theory and completely ignored, bypassed, the Misappropriation
Theory. And so the conflicting Circuits, 3 to 2, remain in the same dark-
ness that enveloped them before O'Hagan came up on certiorari.
Understandably, the Ginsburg holding came under immediate,
strong attack.13 Witness the first Part of this Study, "The Misappropria-
tion Theory Ignored":
The O'Hagan Court by Justice Ginsburg never directly faced the con-
cise question posed by the five Circuits: Does the Misappropriation
Theory conform to Section 10(b)?1
4
The failure of the Court even to address the Misappropriation The-
ory was analyzed and forcefully confirmed in great detail in the first half
of this Study. Accordingly, Ginsburg's deft sidestep of the subject
requires no further discussion at present.
Moreover, the Misappropriation Theory has been critiqued to death
in three other predecessor studies. First, the history and deficiencies of
the Theory were lengthily laid out in 1994 in "The Insider's Natural-
Law Duty: Chestman and the 'Misappropriation Theory.""'5
Then, as a follow-up, Judge Luttig's superb Bryan on the Circuit
level - which was embraced in toto by Judge Hansen's O'Hagan
below"6 - was closely analyzed, and praised, in "The Awakening"' 7 in
10. Id. at 692 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
11. Id. at 687 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
12. Id. at 688-89 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
13. See, e.g., Carol B. Swanson, Reinventing Insider Trading: The Supreme Court
Misappropriates the Misappropriation Theory, 32 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 1157 (1997); Steven A.
Ramirez & Christopher M. Gilbert, The Misappropriation Theory of Insider Trading Under
United States v. O'Hagan: Why Its Bark Is Worse Than Its Bite, 26 Sac. REo. L.J. (WEsTGRouP)
162 (1998).
14. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory Ignored, supra note 1, at 2.
15. Bayne, Chestman, supra note 5.
16. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
17. David Cowan Bayne, S.J., Insider Trading and the Misappropriation Theory: The




Finally, again in 1997, the Eighth Circuit O'Hagan was hailed -
prematurely, thanks to Justice Ginsburg - as "The Demise of the Mis-
appropriation Theory. '"18
In short, many of the principal errors bedeviling the law have been
addressed. But what does still demand analysis?
Fallacies Amid the Ruins
The obiter remarks of the Court left abundant evidence of a large
residue of error that requires refutation.
The immediate burden, therefore, is to address those interrelated
errors still obvious in the Court's thinking in O'Hagan. That is the
'sharp delineation' of this Study.
A Precise Presage of the Ginsburg Lapses
In the opening paragraph of her Opinion, Justice Ginsburg appro-
priately posed the "prime questions'"19 she set for answer, and in it gave
a preview of the course of her thinking, and her de facto elimination of
the Insider Trade itself:
[W]e address and resolve...: Is a Person who trades in securities
for personal profit, using confidential information misappropriated
in breach of a Fiduciary Duty to the Source of the Information,
guilty of violating § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5?2°
That, in germ, is the Court's abbreviated version of the 'Insider
Trade' of which James Herman was found guilty.
All the major Ginsburg deficiencies come together in that formal
statement of the Court's objective. Therein lies the outline of her Opin-
ion, and the questions facing this Article: (i) Who Is an 'Insider'? (ii)
Wherein Lies the Deception of the Trade? (iii) Why a 'Fiduciary Duty'?
(iv) Is the 'Source' of the Information the Insider's Victim? (v) What
Happened to the Insider Trade?
But most important: All those questions coalesce and are answered
in the proof of the overall Thesis of this Study: The Insider Trade of the
past is nowhere to be found in O'Hagan.
A Necessary Prelection
As befitting the gravity of the subject, however, six pertinent reflec-
18. David Cowan Bayne, Insider Trading: The Demise of the Misappropriation Theory -
And Thereafter, 41 ST. Louis U. L.J. 625 (1997).
19. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647 (emphasis added).
20. Id. (emphasis and capitalization added).
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tions are necessary to set the scene: (1) The Pervasive Harm of Insider
Trading, (2) The Utter Simplicity of the 'Insider' Scam, (3) The Gov-
erning Law: Section 10(b) and Its Elements, (4) The Congressional Pur-
poses Behind Section 10(b), (5) The Legal Elements of the Insider
Trade, (6) James Herman O'Hagan's Road to the Supreme Court.
(1) The Pervasive Harm of Insider Trading
The human propensity to cheat one's neighbor has found increasing
expression in the modem-day scam of the Insider Trade. That elemental
fraud has joined its common-law predecessors as the modem variant of
the other numerous 'deceit' stratagems by which the trusting innocent
has been parted from his money.
Chairman Levitt of the SEC has recently expressed his concern
about the prevalence of this stock swindle. He adduced as evidence the
marked proliferation of SEC prosecutions for the crime.
In a recent speech to securities lawyers, SEC Chairman Arthur
Levitt identified insider trading as a growing problem. He cited the
record 48 insider cases the agency filed in the past fiscal year, ended
Sept. 30, [1997,] and a record number of investigations under way.
Most of last year's cases involved corporate insiders."1
In the same speech, Chairman Levitt noted:
"[Y]ou can split hairs all you want, but ethically, it's very clear: If
analysts or their firms are trading - knowing this [inside] informa-
tion, and prior to public release - it's just as wrong as if corporate
insiders did it."
22
In short, the problem of Insider Trading is serious today, and has
been for nearly a century.
Indeed, the Courts, the Commission and the Bar have been trying
with great sincerity and diligence to solve this problem. The SEC has
been in the forefront, notably with its Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act.
The days of Chairman William Cary - 1961-1964 - had given great
promise of success. The twenty years following his "case of first
impression, 23 Cady, Roberts, and the progeny it sired, were the Golden
Age.
2 4
But in 1980 the Timorous Powell perpetrated Chiarella,25 and from
21. Michael Schroeder, Nine Charged in a Trading Case Tied to Merck's Purchase of Medco,
WALL ST. J., Mar. 12, 1998, at B8, col. 1.
22. Paul Beckett, SEC's Levitt Sees More Inside Trades By Stock Analysts, WALL ST. J., Mar.
2, 1998, at C21, col. 1, 1998 WL-WSJ 3484609.
23. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
24. See Bayne, Chestman, supra note 5, at 93-135, for an outline and discussion of these
cases.
25. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980) (Powell, J., for the 6-3 majority).
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then to the present all the valiant efforts to distinguish away the errors of
Chiarella only led the courts further and further from the rudimentary
simplicity of the Insider Trade itself, and from the time-proven law that
could and should deal with it.
26
O'Hagan, the Watershed
Now, the fallacious attempts to circumvent Chiarella have pro-
duced Ginsburg's O'Hagan.27 Yet here was the ideal moment: Judge
Luttig of the Fourth Circuit28 - followed unqualifiedly by Judge Han-
sen's O'Hagan29 in the Eighth - gave the Supreme Court the unparal-
leled opportunity to wipe the slate clean. To get rid of the principal
obstacle, the Misappropriation Theory, and get to the task of correcting
the lesser errors antedating Chiarella.
Were the Misappropriation Theory at last in the dustbin, the Court
could then have addressed (a) the correct definition of the Insider, (b)
the total distinction of Deceit from Theft, (c) the intrusion of Fiduciary
Duty into a totally nonfiducial 'Deceit,' (d) the Misdirected Solicitude
for the Source of the 'inside' information, (e) the easy identification of
the true Victim of the Insider Trade, the public Investor. And most of
all: The marked difference between an Insider Trade and the Theft of
Information.
But the Court assigned the case to Justice Ginsburg, and the result
was a lost opportunity. And the chaos of O'Hagan.
Now comes the salvage process. What can be done to make the
most of the present predicament? If strong steps are not now taken, a
decade of continued chaos could ensue.
(2) The Utter Simplicity of the 'Insider' Scam
Four stories - so simple as to be Parables - will set the stage, and
show just how elementary are the perceived 'complexities' of the law of
Insider Trading:
The Widdie and the Friar Lands: The Widow Strong, minority
owner of the famed Friar Lands of the Philippines, was approached,
secretly and indirectly, toward the sale of her shares. But the would-be
buyer, the firm's CEO, failed to disclose the impending sale of the Friar
Lands to the U.S., at well above market. The Widow sold. The U.S.
bought. The Widow Strong lost millions. That was in 1909.
Markup Vinnie: In the early eighties a lowly markup man at a Wall
26. See Bayne, Chestman, supra note 5.
27. See Bayne, Misappropriation Theory Ignored, supra note 1.
28. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
29. United States v. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d 612 (8th Cir. 1996).
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Street financial press learned of a soon-to-be-consummated takeover.
Knowing of the certain jump post-takeover in the target's stock, Vinnie
Chiarella bought low from unknowing sellers. And sold high after-
wards. Investors' loss: $30,000. That was 1980.
The Market Guru: Longtime revered market guru and editor of the
widely circulated Value Time newsletter, rushes out of a closed meeting
of "favorite Wall Street analysts"30 staged by a midcapped firm to
announce a doubling of the quarterly dividend. At the telephones the
trusted analyst buys heavily before the press release. Sells after.
Upshot: Clueless sellers lose, trusted analyst pockets, thousands. That
was in 1998.
James Herman, Con Artist: James Herman O'Hagan, securities
lawyer, got wind of the imminent absorption of Pillsbury, the American
household favorite, by the Brit megafirm, Grand Met. Secretly buying
Pillsbury before the press release, and selling after, James Herman
O'Hagan netted an illicit $4 million from uninformed public Investors.
That was the mid-nineties.
The subject of Insider Trading has become so convoluted that eve-
ryone involved - courts, counsel, commentators - forgets that the
Insider Trade is really a garden-variety con. These Parables3 should
help the return to reality.
(3) The Governing Law: Section 10(b) and Its Elements
The courts in the last ten years have been so embroiled in disputes
revolving around the "misappropriation theory" vis-A-vis the "tradi-
tional" or "classical theory" - Justice Ginsburg spends three lengthy
paragraphs on them early in her Opinion32 - that one ignores the fact
that James Herman O'Hagan was sent to jail for violating Section 10(b),
a longstanding and long-known provision of the Securities Exchange
Act of 1934.33
Remember henceforward, therefore, that this Study is an analysis of
Section 10(b) as applied to the facts in O'Hagan. Not a digression fur-
ther away from Section 10(b).
Toward a constant reminder of that salient fact, read Justice Gins-
burg's cautionary words. She did clearly recognize that this was the true
focus of her Opinion:
30. Arthur Levitt, SEC Chairman, in a speech to a conference of securities lawyers, on
February 27, 1998, WALL ST. J., Mar. 2, 1998 at C21, col. 1.
31. All are embroidered but actual cases: except the third, which is in potentia.
32. United States v. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642, 651-53 (1997).
33. See id. at 649.
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Pursuant to its § 10(b) rulemaking authority, the Commission
has adopted Rule lOb-5, which, as relevant here, provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person...
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or]
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates ... as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
"In connection with the purchase or sale of any security. 34
Codified Common-Law Deceit
After the Wall Street cataclysm of 1929, the Congress determined
to restore integrity to the securities market, with particular attention to
the victimized public Investor.
To this end, Congress prudently reached back into the common
law, and codified the age-old tort of Deceit. And then added a Federal
nonsubstantive prescription: The Investor deception must occur "in con-
nection with" the "purchase or sale" of a security.
After years of judicial implementation, the courts reached a black-
letter consensus as to the nature of Section 10(b). The Fifth Circuit in
the 1981 Huddleston36 - a favorite of law-school casebooks -
expressed, the prevailing interpretation:
ELEMENTS OF THE CAUSE OF
ACTION UNDER SECTION 10(b)
AND RULE lOb-5
The elements necessary to prove a Section 10(b) claim have
been so often applied by the lower federal courts that they can be
stated in black letter fashion. To make out a claim under Section
10(b), which is based on the common law action of deceit, the
plaintiff must establish (1) a misstatement or an omission (2) of mate-
rial fact (3) made with scienter (4) on which the plaintiff relied (5)
that proximately caused his injury.37
These black-letter basics - "so often applied" - will be the foundation
stone for this Study. And the Congressional purposes underlying them
and Section 10(b) will give controlling guidance to the analysis of
O'Hagan. As indeed they avowedly did for Justice Ginsburg. Recall
this when the discussion drifts off to matters unrelated to the sale of a
security.
34. Id. at 651 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996).
35. See Bayne, Misappropriation Theory Ignored, supra note 1.
36. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), affd in part, reversed
in part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
37. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 543 (emphasis added).
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(4) The Congressional Purposes Behind Section 10(b)
Since O'Hagan is an analysis of the essence of Section 10(b), Jus-
tice Ginsburg, willy-nilly, founds her holding on the 'deceit' elements of
Section 10(b) and the intent of the Congress behind it.38 Thus Justice
Ginsburg properly approaches the O'Hagan adjudication by
[c]onsidering the inhibiting impact on market participation . . . and
the congressional purposes underlying § 10(b) .. .
She specifies these purposes broadly and accurately:
[An animating purpose of the Exchange Act: to insure honest securi-
ties markets and thereby promote INVESTOR confidence.4"
A point that Justice Ginsburg will emphasize throughout should be
stressed now by highlighting her reference to the Congressional intent to
protect the trading Investor, victimized by the Insider
who trades in securities for personal profit, using confidential
information.'"
The SEC concurs with Justice Ginsburg. The Commission's clas-
sic statement of the purpose of Section 10(b) came early, in Cady, Rob-
erts, "a case of first impression and one of signal importance in our
administration of the Federal securities acts. '4 2 There, Cady, Roberts
stressed the protection of the Investor: Section 10(b) concentrates on
"the plight of the buying public wholly unprotected from the misuse of
special information."3
(5) The Legal Elements of the Insider Trade
For four decades the Commission and the courts have addressed the
Insider Trade as a violation of Section 10(b), and, necessarily, its under-
lying common-law essentials."a In short, the Insider Trade is defined by
the specific requisites of Section 10(b) as tailored expressly for the sale-
of-security context.
Those basics of Deceit - as just quoted from the Fifth Circuit
Huddlestona5 and long memorized by every securities-law student - are
the constituents of the Insider Trade:
38. Justice Ginsburg discusses briefly the intent ("purpose") of the Exchange Act at 521 U.S.
642, 657.
39. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 659.
40. Id. at 658.
41. Id. at 647.
42. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 907 (1961) (emphasis added).
43. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 913 (emphasis added).
44. See Bayne, Chestman, supra note 5, at 96; see generally Bayne, The Essence, supra note
5.
45. Supra note 37 and accompanying text.
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A misstatement of a material fact, made knowingly, scienter, to
induce reliance, with consequent reliance, and damage.46
Which, of course, track the requisites of every tort: Duty, Breach, Proxi-
mate Cause, Damages, Absence of Defenses.
Aided by the four Parables, these Section-10(b) elements find easy
adaptation to the Insider Trade:
The Insider - any person whosoever - on the basis of material
nonpublic information, arising from any source, deceives, by the mis-
statement or nondisclosure of the true value of a security, the Inves-
tor on the other side of the trade.
That is the precise definition of the Insider Trade prohibited by
Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 47 and historically implemented by the
courts and Commission. That definition will be the reference point of
this analysis of O'Hagan.
The Definition Analyzed in the Parables
The presentation of the four Parables was founded on the valid
assumption that every reader - from the least erudite Everyman, legally
deprived, to the most captious securities expert, even the Academic
enmeshed in the net of nether-world formalisms - would spontane-
ously realize that each aggrieved Investor in each Parable had been bla-
tantly cheated in an unadorned instance of the well-known sale-of-
securities con, the Insider Trade.
Take the black-letter basics and find them in the four Parables:
The Insider
The Parables set out designedly to illustrate that the word 'Insider'
is a total misnomer. That the "any person" of the so-called 'Insider'
Trade need not be inside anything. He simply has come upon informa-
tion, confidential and secret, that the Investor does not have. The fact
that the term 'Insider' is a misnomer, must be emphasized repeatedly.
The CEO of the corporate owner of the Friar Lands was privy to
the counsels of the company, true, but his nondisclosure would have
cheated the Widdie Strong just as thoroughly and painfully had he been
the janitor in the company men's room, as long as he had the nonpublic
information and used it to deceive the Widow.
Vinnie Chiarella could not have been further outside the target
46. 2 DAVID C. BAYNE, S.J., PRACTITIONER'S CORPORATIONS CASEBOOK 2-4-1 (perm. ed.
1987) (quoted in Bayne, Chestman, supra note 5, at 88-89, n.77); see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
TORTS §525 (1976).
47. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994)..
1999]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
company, yet his information fully deceived his sellers and netted him
$30,000 in illicit Investor loot.
James Herman was just as distant from Pillsbury as Vinnie was
from the target company, but his information was just as effective.
And the closest the Value Time 'trusted analyst' came to the corpo-
ration was at its staged meeting, when the dividend hike was privately
announced pre-press-time.
The Deception
Every Investor - the Widow Strong, Markup Vinnie's "unknow-
ing sellers," James Herman's "uninformed public Investors," Market
Guru's "clueless sellers" - was deceived, in each case by the nondis-
closure of nonpublic information, to which he had a right and which was
material, even essential, to an informed investment judgment.
The Source of the Information
Not one of the in-the-dark Investors cared a whit where the CEO,
Vinnie, James Herman, the expert analyst, came by their Information.
All each Investor knew was that the four flimflam men actually had the
secret information, and used it to defraud him. The Source meant nil.
The Victim: the Investor
Every Parable told the same story: In a securities transaction the
Investor Victims were on the other side of a stock trade and lost valuable
dollars. In no story was the Source of the secret a Victim. The Source
played no direct role in the Insider Trade.
(6) James Herman O'Hagan's Road to the Supreme Court
James O'Hagan began his predestined path to self-destruction in his
midfifties, if not before. By age 56 he was sentenced to eight concurrent
terms in prison for theft from the Dorsey-and-Whitney client trust
fund.4 8 As a senior partner at Minnesota's most prestigious law firm, he
was a successful attorney for 26 years, "highly respected by clients and
fellow attorneys .... specializing in ... securities cases."49
Next he was found guilty of $750,000 in tax delinquencies, was
subjected to protracted SEC scrutiny in the late eighties, and finally dis-
48. State v. O'Hagan, 474 N.W.2d 613, 615 (C.A. Minn. 1991).
49. See Bayne, Misappropriation Theory Ignored, supra note 1, at 9 n.35.
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barred.5 0 At this writing he faces sentencing for bald Insider Trading.5'
The Insider Trade
The fourth Parable told the tale. Privy to incontrovertible and con-
fidential information, via a Dorsey partner, that Dorsey's client Grand
Met, the Brit megacorp, was about to absorb the foodstuff giant Pills-
bury, James Herman secretly amassed Pillsbury common before, and
sold after, the news broke.
On October 4, 1988, Grand Met publicly announced its tender offer
for Pillsbury stock [which] immediately rose from $39 per share to
almost $60 per share." 52
Result: $4 million in illicit gain from unknowing innocents. That was
the Insider Trade.
Note too that O'Hagan's Inside Information was not only certain,
but
reliable, not conjectural, nonpublic, relevant and material to an
informed trade ... which ... the Shareholder has a right to
know
5 3
as the Compendium54 - a detailed, studied, exact delineation of all the
elements of the Insider's Duty - succinctly laid out in the "Formal
Statement of Insider Duty" in Essence in 1992. 55
From SEC to Ginsburg's O'Hagan
The SEC began the criminal process at an early date, and shortly
secured a 57-count indictment in the District Court in Minnesota. The
grounds: Mail fraud, securities fraud and money laundering.
The case proceeded to trial, and a jury convicted O'Hagan on all
57 counts. The district court sentenced O'Hagan to 41 months of
50. See In re O'Hagan, 450 N.W.2d 571 (Minn. 1990). O'Hagan's troubles take on the
proportions of a soap-opera epic. See, e.g., Ann O'Hagan v. United States, 86 F.3d 776 (8th Cir.
1996) (resisting IRS seizure of property for unpaid taxes); SEC v. O'Hagan, 901 F.Supp. 1461 (D.
Minn. 1995) (action for injunction and disgorgement); State v. O'Hagan, 474 N.W.2d 613 (Ct.
App. Minn. 1991) (embezzlement from client settlement funds); Roger Lowenstein, Insider
Trading: Oughta Be a Law, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 1997 at CI, 1997 WL-WSJ 2411059; Former
Lawyer Told to Pay $7.7 Million for Insider Trading, WALL ST. J., Aug. 11, 1995, 1995 WL-WSJ
9895719; Ex-Attorney Convicted in Inside-Trading Case Tied to Pillsbury Deal, WALL ST. J., Feb.
11, 1994, 1994 WL-WSJ 305746; Attorney is Accused of Diverting Funds Paid by Mayo Clinic,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 8, 1989, 1989 WL-WSJ 458555; Richard Gibson, Attorney Resigns Firm After
SEC Probes Trades in Pillsbury Options, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 1989, 1989 WL-WSJ 490924.
51. United States v. O'Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 645 (8th Cir. 1998).
52. See Bayne, Misappropriation Theory Ignored, supra note 1, at 8 n.28.
53. Cf Bayne, The Essence, supra note 5, at 353.
54. The Compendium was the distillate of the reasoning excogitated in "Insider Trading: The
Essence of the Insider's Duty," id. (the Compendium itself can be found at id., 352-53).
55. Id. at 352-53.
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imprisonment. O'Hagan appeals.56
This conviction was founded solely on the Misappropriation Theory.
The pleadings left the Court no alternate route.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit vacated - to O'Hagan's happy sur-
prise - all of O'Hagan's convictions. But the crux of the reversal was
the invalidation of the insider-trading count. Since the mail fraud and
money laundering depended on the Section-10(b) violation, both fell
when Judge Hansen, writing for a 2-to-I majority, ruled: The Misappro-
priation Theory does not conform to Section-1O(b) requisites, and hence
will not support a conviction of James O'Hagan.7
This was a precise holding, and sent the Circuits into a 3-to-2
conflict.
Justice Ginsburg
In 1997 the Supreme Court finally addressed the uncertainty of the
conflict. Or so the Bench, Bar and investing public had hoped. The
Circuits were head-to-head. The Second led the charge, and was in fact
the creator of and principal protagonist for the Misappropriation Theory,
albeit indecisively, with an inconclusive 6-to-5 en-banc bench.58
Aligned with the Second were single, and half-hearted, opinions by the
Seventh and Ninth. 9
Bryan61 in 1995, by the astute Judge J. Michael Luttig, was the first
to break sharply with the Theory. Judge Hansen and the Eighth in
O'Hagan retraced Bryan.
This set the stage for certiorari, and the reversal by Ginsburg's
O'Hagan, 6 to 3. The dissent was written by Justice Clarence Thomas,
joined by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist. Justices Breyer,
Kennedy, O'Connor, Souter and Stevens joined the Majority, but with-
out comment.
The Court also addressed a tender-offer question involving fraudu-
lent practices under Section 14(e) of the 1934 Act6' and Rule 14e-3(a). 62
The Court affirmed the Eighth Circuit and ruled that the Commission
did not exceed its rulemaking authority in enacting Rule 14e-3(a).63
56. O'Hagan, 92 F.3d at 615.
57. Id. at 613. See Bayne, Thereafter, supra note 18.
58. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004
(1992).
59. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 1071 (1992); SEC v.
Clark, 915 F.2d 439 (9th Cir. 1990).
60. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933 (4th Cir. 1995).
61. Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, § 14(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1988).
62. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14e-3(a) (1996).
63. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 667-73.
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This ruling does not impinge on the Misappropriation Theory. So too
with the mail and wire fraud.6
Michael R. Dreeben, Deputy Solicitor General of the United States
argued for the Government and John D. French of Faegre & Benson of
Minneapolis for Mr. O'Hagan.
Then, on remand to the Eighth Circuit, the earlier reversal of the
Court below was dutifully rescinded.65 An abandoned District Judge in
Minnesota will now rule on the length of the sentence of a jailed
O'Hagan.
In summary pronouncement on the Court's reinstatement of
O'Hagan's conviction, it must forcefully be said with the elegance of
T.S. Eliot's Thomas A Becket:
The last temptation is the greatest treason:
To do the right deed for the wrong reason.
- Murder in the Cathedral
66
The truth still remains: The 'end' does not justify the 'means.'
Chiarella is the culprit. Address it directly.
With that prelection, the way lies clear for the principal argumen-
tation.
The Thesis Set for Proof
One major objective will occupy this Article: To establish:
That the Supreme Court in O'Hagan, (1) Abandoned all judi-
cial consideration of the tort of Insider Trading, and (2) Sub-
stituted an ancient crime, Theft, in its place.
Five divisions will undertake this objective: I. O'HAGAAS ELU-
SIVE 'INSIDER,' II. THE ABSENCE OF 'DECEIT' IN THE 'THEFT,' III. THE
INEXPLICABLE INTRUSION OF A 'FIDUCIARY DUTY,' IV. A FOREIGN VIC-
TIM, WITHOUT A REMEDY, V. 'THEFT OF INFORMATION' VIS-A-VIS
INSIDER TRADING.
This presentation designedly embodies all four of the substantive
essentials of the definitive Insider Trade of history: (1) The Insider him-
self, (2) Deceit, (3) Duty to Disclose, (4) the Investor Victim. The ques-
tion of the nonsubstantive Federal appendage - "in connection with" a
securities transaction67 - is adequately answered en route.
The culmination of the proof of the Thesis will be reached in the
fifth division in which the essentials of the tort of Insider Trading -
64. Id. at 677-78.
65. United States v. O'Hagan, 139 F.3d 641 (8th Cir. 1998).
66. T.S. ELIOT, MURDER IN THE CATHEDRAL 44 (1935).
67. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1994) ("section 10(b)"); 17
C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1993) ("Rule l0b-5").
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totally ignored in O'Hagan - will be juxtaposed against the essentials
of the Misappropriation Theory, the Theft of Information. Thereby
emphasizing the total absence of an Insider Trade in O'Hagan.
Preliminary Postulates
This Study approaches the analysis of the Supreme Court's position
on Insider Trading, as of 1999, in full recognition of three handicaps to a
satisfying commentary. These are legal facts of life, and produce three
valid assumptions that impact the analysis.
Shifting Sand
The most recent history of the Court in the matter of Insider Trad-
ing - the years from Chiarella,68 1980, to O'Hagan, 1998 - has been
characterized by turmoil. Chiarella was "an enigma"69 and the "dis-
putes among the Justices in Chiarella"70 were decried.
As for O'Hagan, earlier commentary,71 and this Article, tell the
story. The O'Hagan Court was divided, 6 to 3, and Justice Thomas and
the minority were compelling. This dissonance portends radical shifts of
attitudes and position, and bodes ill for stability.
Further, the political flux in the nation promises imminent changes
in the Court's complexion. Any pronouncements on the 'mind of the
Court' could be short-lived.
Clairvoyance Required
The O'Hagan Majority - whence the bulk of the present conclu-
sions emanate - is so difficult to understand, so filled with contradic-
tions, so superficial in analysis, as to render positions of this Study open
to immediate question. Yet these conclusions are the only ones that
logic will permit. The dangers, however, in forming judgments sup-
ported by such garbled argumentation are inevitable, and must be postu-
lated at the outset.
Ambivalence and Vacillation
To prove the Thesis of this Article - that the Court has not
addressed Insider Trading at all, but is speaking throughout, formally
and adjudicatively, to an ancient crime, Theft, now latterly used to sup-
68. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
69. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551, 575 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1759 (1992).
70. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824, 837 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
71. See supra note 5.
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plant the Insider Trade - a third, particularly important obstacle stands
in the way. The Court is ambivalent. It cannot seem to make up its
mind.
Thus, Justice Ginsburg pays convincing lip-service to the Misap-
propriation Theory. The result: Everyone - the Circuits at odds below,
the Government, the attorneys, Bench, Bar and certainly Academe - all
publicly hailed, or decried, O'Hagan as an approbation of the Misappro-
priation Theory. A less-than-scrutinizing reader would surely conclude
that O'Hagan was an endorsement of the Theory. Thus spoke the
Eighth Circuit's O'Hagan, on remand: "The Supreme Court ... holding
[was] based on the 'misappropriation theory."' 72
But, Justices Thomas, Scalia, the Chief - and in 1998 "The Misap-
propriation Theory Ignored"7 - concluded that Justice Ginsburg never
addressed the Theory at all, and clandestinely based her decision on her
own New Theory. The effect: The Court was at odds with itself.
(Perhaps 'clandestinely' is not the right word, as it means 'secret'
or 'surreptitious' and implies such an intent. The impugning exchanges
in the Opinion between Justices Ginsburg and Thomas withal, better to
conclude that Justice Ginsburg's 'maneuvers' are more the result of
muddled thinking than stealth or sharp rhetoric.)
These three admonitions must accompany the proof of the Thesis.
In constructing that proof, each building block - the several essen-
tials of the Insider Trade - will be sought out in the Opinion, and found
to be missing. Nowhere can Insider Trading per se be discovered in the
Court's analysis of the 'tort' committed by James Herman O'Hagan. In
the Court's judicial approbation of the Misappropriation Theory, Insider
Trading is absent.
And, very much to the point, this plain old crime, 'Theft,' totally
lacking an Insider Trade, has remarkably been called 'Insider Trading.'
The fruitless search for the Insider Trade leads to the inevitable
conclusion, the Subthesis of this Article: Because each individual essen-
tial to an Insider Trade is lacking, the totality of Insider Trading is, eo
ipso, lacking.
I. O'HAGAA"S ELUSIVE 'INSIDER'
This first, and arguably a paramount, essential of the Insider Trade,
the Insider himself, is nowhere to be found in the O'Hagan Opinion.
'Elusive' is an understatement. Justice Ginsburg abandoned every
72. O'Hagan, 139 F.3d 641, 645 (8th Cir. 1998).
73. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory Ignored, supra note 1.
1999]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
attempt at a definition. In the end, no 'Insider' of any stripe can be
found.
The current Court's thinking on Insider Trading has become so
confused that its terminology must be sharply defined. Explicit concepts
are basic to clarity. Foremost in the confusion is the definition of the
Insider.
The Divergent Versions of the 'Insider'
Four distinctly different 'Insiders' - each at odds with each - can
be extracted from the pages of O'Hagan: (i) The Traditional Consensus
of the common law and the SEC, (ii) Powell's 'Fiduciary' corruption of
the Traditional position, in Chiarella, (iii) The Misappropriator 'Out-
sider' of the Misappropriation Theory, formally endorsed by O'Hagan,
and (iv) The Ginsburg 'Insider,' subtly implied in O'Hagan in order to
justify the incarceration of Mr. O'Hagan. Herewith a concise pr6cis of
each:
The Four 'Insiders'
The Traditional 'Tom, Dick or Harry'
This embodiment of the consensus Insider of the common law (Strong v. Repide,
1909), was canonized by the SEC with the words "any person... no matter who," in
Cady, Roberts, 1961, and its Federal progeny, Texas Gulf Sulphur and Merrill Lynch,
1961-1980. Never directly discussed by O'Hagan. Rejected as foreign to its thinking.
The Powell 'Fiduciary Insider'
This work of Justice Powell's Chiarella and Dirks held that Only (1) "corporate insid-
ers" who hence are (2) trusted confidants of the Victim, are liable for Insider Trading.
All others, scot-free. Ruled inapplicable by O'Hagan.
The Misappropriator 'Outsider'
This creation of the Misappropriation Theory was designed to circumvent Powell's
Chiarella. Substituted 'Theft-of-Information from the Source' for the Insider Trade.
Hence, the Thief became the 'Insider.' Eliminated duty to, deception of, and harm to,
the conned Victim. Nominally endorsed by O'Hagan, without a true definition.
The Ginsburg 'Insider'
Inferences point to an 'Insider' redolent of 'Tom, Dick or Harry,' but Ginsburg's New
Theory never overtly attempted an explicit definition. Value: Obiter statements for
future argumentation.
At this point recall the Subthesis of this Article: Because each ele-
ment of the Insider Trade is absent, necessarily the whole is absent. A




The Successive Rejection of Each 'Insider'
Each one of the four divergent versions of an Insider is succes-
sively excluded from acceptance. Recall this as Justice Ginsburg first
adverts to each one in turn, perhaps discusses it, but then rejects it in one
way or other. Thus does she succeed in eliminating the Insider from her
O 'Hagan.
(At times the wonder even arises if the Justice really knows the
Insider Trade of the Parables. Or who an Insider really is. She seems to
be talking of some other tort and of some other malefactor. Ask this
question: About whom is she speaking now? A Vinnie, Ivan, Michael or
James Herman? Or a second-story man in an intellectual-property heist?
Or a Willie Sutton who by chance makes off with 'inside' merger plans
along with looted cash?)
The First 'Insider': The Traditional 'Tom, Dick or Harry'
When stripped of all its collateral nonessentials, the Insider
Trade - as the four Parables so clearly illustrated - is 2-plus-2 in
simplicity. It is an elemental scam. But the sad fact remains that these
'collateral nonessentials' have not been stripped away. This is in spite
of the commendable efforts by both the Commission and the courts dur-
ing the decades of the sixties and seventies.
Chief among the causes for the persistent inability of the legal com-
munity to understand the law of the Insider Trade has been a failure at
the very threshold of its thinking. The law has not, thus far, accepted the
correct definition of the Insider. Yet how ridiculous it is to speak at all,
without first knowing about whom to speak.
The Cause of the Misunderstanding
The genuine Insider of the Insider Trade can blame two causes for
this misunderstood persona, one totally accidental, the other rooted in a
truly substantive distortion of the Insider's essential nature.
The accidental cause has defied correction for decades, despite all
the earnest attempts - seemingly now abandoned - by Commission
and courts. The substantive cause has, moreover, become even more
pernicious in recent years, reaching a nadir with Chiarella7 4 - so many
serious errors are rooted in Chiarella75 - and is now further entrenched
by Ginsburg's O'Hagan.
A brief discussion of these causes, (1) the accidental, then (2) the
74. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
75. See Bayne, Chiarella, supra note 5.
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substantive, will clear the path to the proper, and truly elementary, defi-
nition of the Insider.
(1) The Genesis of the Misnomer: The Red Herring, Section 16(b)
When Congress set out in 1933 to protect the Investor and eradicate
the securities abuses of the twenties and early thirties, two sections of
the 1934 Act addressed two unrelated areas of justified concern. One
was the 'deceit' prevalent in the purchase and sale of securities - hence
Section 10(b) and whence the law of Insider Trading - and the other
was the 'short-swing profit' -honest in se but susceptible of misuse
which was covered by Section 16(b).76
The True Insider: The Short-Swing Profiteer
Section 16(b) prohibited any profits earned - innocently, even
without the infallible aid of inside information - by an actual insider of
a corporation, an officer, director or owner of 10 percent of corporate
stock, as long as the profits were gained in a six-month period.77
Section 16(b) was a strict-trust, absolute-liability statute designed
to ban such, often honest, profits on the theory that such an Insider, with
inside access to corporate counsels, was possibly, even probably, up to
no good if he bought, and then soon sold, stock in his own company.
The Misnomer
That guiltless definition of a true Insider misled, confused, the
unthinking court and commentator when they later read Section 10(b).
Even though Section 10(b) was totally unrelated and totally foreign to
Section 16(b). Section 10(b) requires full culpability, is an intentional
tort, and had nothing to do with an 'Insider.' But applied to "any per-
son, directly or indirectly," as both Section 10(b) and its implementing
Rule 10b-5 explicitly state.78
The Commission in 1961 set out to clarify exactly the definition in
its earliest, first-impression case, Cady, Roberts. The goal: To abort the
misnomer at its conception.
Section [10(b)] and Rule lOb-5 apply to securities transactions
76. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 16(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1994).
77. Id.
78. Section 10(b): "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly... (b) To use
or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security . . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance .... " Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §78j.
Rule lOb-5: "It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly ..... C.F.R.
§ 240.10b-5.
See generally Bayne, Essence, supra note 5.
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by "any person." Misrepresentations will lie within their ambit, no
matter who the speaker may be.
7 9
The Second Circuit in the famed Texas Gulf Sulphur 0 - sired by
Cady, Roberts - joined the chorus:
Insiders, as directors or management officers are, of course, by this
Rule, precluded from so unfairly dealing, but the Rule is also applica-
ble to one possessing the information who may not be strictly
termed an "insider" within the meaning of Sec. 16(b) of the Act.
Cady, Roberts, supra. Thus, anyone in possession of material inside
information must... disclose it to the investing public .... 81
But to no avail. The misnomer persists, and continues to the pres-
ent to contribute to the sloppy thinking.
(2) The Timorous Justice Powell
Far more serious was the impact of that latter-day societal malady:
The consuming fear of placing moral responsibility on anyone, even on
the most flagrant of malefactors. The odium of being 'judgmental,' of
ever ascribing blame.
Mr. Justice Powell was beset by this fear. His Chiarella remains to
this day the standard-bearer of the forces fearful of labeling "any per-
son" an 'Insider,' lest too many miscreants be caught in the Section-
10(b) net, as they justly ought to be.
Justice Powell - first in Chiarella and then later in his Dirks -
kept narrowing and narrowing his definition of an Insider until the ambit
of Insider liability included only fiduciaries,' who were also 'corporate
insiders.' The Insider, to be liable, must be in "a relationship of trust
and confidence" 2 with his Victim. All others, a Chiarella, Boesky,
Milken or O'Hagan, could lie with impunity about the true value of the
traded stock.
That, in briefest summary, is the sad state into which the Insider has
fallen. Yet a readily-understood definition of the true Insider is easily at
hand.
"Tom, Dick or Harry"
Throughout the law of Insider Trading, the legalisms of the Theo-
rists have led them further and further from reality. Their futile attempts
79. Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 911 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5) (emphasis added).
80. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
81. Texas Gulf Sulphur, 401 F.2d at 848 (emphasis added).
82. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 662 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 230).
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to define the 'Insider' add appreciably to this unreality. The experts,
especially in Academe, seem incapable of grasping this simple concept.
Yet the four Fables, understood by the most untutored Investor,
show instantaneously who this misnamed 'Insider' really is. Thirty
years ago came this uncluttered definition:
Section 10(b) has not and never has had any connection whatsoever
with "the definition of an insider," but applies to any old Tom, Dick
or Harry in the land who withholds a material fact from any other
Tom, Dick or Harry in the sale or purchase of a security ...83
The essence of the definition lies not in the person - he is any
person - but in the "withhold[ing of] a material fact from any" fellow
Investor. The 'Insider' is not 'inside' anything at all. Unless he could
be said to have an 'inside track' on the information. Or his bilked victim
is 'outside the loop,' and he is 'inside.' No, the word is truly a misno-
mer and goes back to the mixup with the short-swing seller. And to
Powell's twins, Chiarella84 and Dirks85 in the earliest eighties.
Chairman Levitt: Reality Sets In
Just a few months ago, the respected Chairman of the SEC spoke
out the truth and showed how rudimentary the concept is:
"[Y]ou can split hairs all you want but, ethically, it is very clear: If
analysts or their firms are trading - knowing this information, and
prior to public release - it's just as wrong as if corporate insiders
did it."
8 6
Substitute "Tom, Dick or Harry" for Mr. Levitt's "analysts" and the
thrust of his argument persists. The Chairman knew that 'corporate
insiders' were not the only culprits.
It is irresistible to note that when an honest, forthright observer
extricates himself from the 'split hairs' of Chiarella, Dirks, and now
O'Hagan, the primitive nature of this noninside 'Insider' emerges.
Chairman Levitt paid no heed to his SEC staff as they argued O'Hagan.
Or, apparently, vice versa.87 Mirabile!
In the same speech Chairman Levitt again refers to the instantane-
83. David Cowan Bayne, S.J., unpublished Letter to the Editor, WAL ST. J., May 5, 1969 (on
file with the author).
84. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
85. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
86. Paul Beckett, SEC's Levitt Sees More Inside Trades By Stock Analysts, WALL ST. J., Mar.
2, 1998, at C21, col. 1, 1998 WL-WSJ 3484609 (emphasis added).
87. Before the Court, SEC attorneys argued for continued implementation of the
'Misappropriation Theory' as the Commission's only hope in bringing 'insider traders' to justice.




ous transparency of the concept. And he stresses that the essence of the
definition of the so-called 'Insider' lies in the deception, the nondisclo-
sure. Not in the person deceiving.
Mr. Levitt said "any investor looking at this situation would
think it is wrong for those who have received this information to
trade before the public announcement - or to tip off their friends,
family members or colleagues in their firms."88
The Technical Synthesis of the Definition
Some seven years ago, incorporating the intuitive thinking of the
Everyman of the Parables, the instinctive rationality of SEC Chairman
Levitt, the SEC in its Cady, Roberts and twenty years of Federal-court
sanity, the Compendium of the Insider's Duty in "Essence" proposed the
black-letter definition of the true Insider and the essentials of his
persona:
The Compendium of the Insider's Duty
The tort of Insider Trading must satisfy all the standard req-
uisites for common-law deceit and fulfill the specifics of Insider
Trading as well.
The Insider may be any person, with or without a fiduciary
relation, inside or outside the corporation, contrfleur, director or
officer, tipper, tippee, eavesdropper, bystander, who possesses ...
Information of any kind, reliable not conjectural, nonpublic, rele-
vant and material to an informed trade, from any source and not
necessarily misappropriated, which the Shareholder has a right
to know, and the Insider a right to disclose.
The Shareholder may be any legal person, an actual or
potential buyer or seller of shares, unprotected and endangered
by ... Nondisclosure, which carries culpability, is unrelated to
the Insider's trading but consists solely in the failure to
disclose.89
That concludes the conspectus of the Traditional Consensus of the
Insider that the Courts, Commentators, the Bar and most of all the
investing Public had long embraced. The Insider could be any Tom,
Dick or Harry who deceives his fellow trader, using inside information.
Justice Ginsburg overtly abandoned this definition.
The Traditional Consensus Rejected
Throughout her entire Opinion, Justice Ginsburg gave only a glim-
88. Paul Beckett, SEC's Levitt Sees More Inside Trades by Stock Analysts, WALL ST. J., Mar.
2, 1998 at C21, col. 1, 1998 WL-WSJ 3484609.
89. Bayne, The Essence, supra note 5, at 352-53.
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mer of suspicion that she even knew of the commonly accepted Insider
of the Parables and Cady, Roberts. And tellingly, at the very moment
that she revealed that she suspected that "any person" at all could be an
Insider, she rejected the thought summarily.
The Justice revealed incontrovertibly that the Insider Trade she was
forced to lip-serve was neither 'inside' nor a 'trade.' Rather, it was a
theft by an outsider. In footnote six came the brief glimmer.
Justice Ginsburg actually did not even directly discuss Mr.
O'Hagan as an 'insider,' but only as a thief who owed a duty to tell his
employer that he was about to 'misappropriate' some secret information.
She expressed James Herman's duty this way:
Under the misappropriation theory... the disclosure obligation
runs to the source of the information, here, Dorsey & Whitney and
Grand Met. 90
Patently, the Justice is not concerned with whether James Herman is an
'insider' or 'outsider,' or who he is. But only with the object of his
'duty,' his law firm.
From this discussion, no conclusion may be reached as to Justice
Ginsburg's definition of an 'Insider' "under the misappropriation
theory."
Justice Burger and the Traditional 'Insider'
But her discussion then becomes important. As Justice Ginsburg
continues to discuss Mr. O'Hagan's duty, "to the source of the informa-
tion, here, Dorsey & Whitney," she - possibly unwittingly, but none-
theless effectively - rejects outright and summarily the Insider of
Tradition, the "any person" of Cady, Roberts.
True, this rejection has to be pried out of her remarks, but the rejec-
tion is there without doubt. Here is the line of reasoning that contains
her rejection of Tom, Dick or Harry.
Justice Burger, in his dissent in Chiarella, was proposing and dis-
cussing the traditional viewpoint of Section 10(b) as involving common-
law deceit, which imposed on the traditional 'insider' the standard duty
to disclose the true value of the security traded to the Investor. (But not
to the source, Dorsey & Whitney.) Justice Ginsburg explains:
Chief Justice Burger, dissenting in Chiarella, advanced a broader
reading of § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 [that is, to cover "any old Tom,
Dick or Harry"]; the disclosure obligation, as he envisioned, ran to
those with whom the misappropriator trades.
9 1
90. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 n.6 (emphasis added).




She has stated well the major tenet of the traditional consensus of the
SEC and the courts: The Duty of Disclosure rests on "any person, no
matter who [he] may be," to tell the truth about the value of the traded
stock to the Investor.
The Justice then quotes directly from Chief Justice Burger:
"[A] person who has misappropriated nonpublic information has an
absolute duty to disclose that information or to refrain from trading"
92
Arguably, Justice Ginsburg had some idea that she and the Chief
were talking about the traditional approach of the SEC and Cady, Rob-
erts. (At another point in her Opinion she quoted Cady, Roberts on an
innocuous collateral point.93 So someone on her staff knew about that
leading case.)
Justice Burger explained this position and strongly emphasized that
the duty was owed, not to the party from whom the Insider learned the
information, but rather to the party he deceived in using the information,
the Investor he bilked.
In so emphasizing the nature of the traditional trade, Justice Burger
necessarily included the consensus definition of the Insider, the person
who cheated the Investor.
Further, he was definitely not talking at all about the Misappropria-
tion Theory which was not even before the Chiarella Court, but about
the old-line interpretation of Section 10(b).
At the end of Justice Ginsburg's brief excursion into the mind of
the Chief Justice came her categorical rejection of the Burger position.
And necessarily and of current overriding import, her total rejection of
the Traditional Consensus of the definition of the Insider.
She gave the very thought of the Burger argument the coup de
grace, out of hand:
The Government does not propose that we adopt a misappropriation
theory of that breadth.94
She was right about the "breadth." That Traditional 'theory' of the
Chief Justice would indeed "catch [much] of the misbehavior that all too
often makes investment in securities a needlessly risky business for the
uninitiated investor," to paraphrase Justice Blackmun in Chiarella.95
But she was wrong in another matter. Chief Justice Burger was not
92. Id. (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 240 (Burger, C.J., dissenting)).
93. Id. at 652 (quoting Chiarella at 228-29, but omitting reference to the source, Cady,
Roberts).
94. Id. at 655 n.6 (emphasis added).
95. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 246 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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talking about "a misappropriation theory" at all. It was plain old Sec-
tion 10(b).
So with that perfunctory rejection of the all-inclusive Insider, Jus-
tice Ginsburg has eliminated the first of the four versions, the Tradi-
tional 'Tom, Dick or Harry Insider':
The Traditional 'Tom, Dick or Harry'
This embodiment of the consensus Insider of the common law (Strong v. Repide,
1909), was canonized by the SEC with the words "any person... no matter who, " in
Cady, Roberts, 1961, and its Federal progeny, Texas Gulf Sulphur and Merrill Lynch,
1961-1980. Never directly discussed by O'Hagan. Rejected as foreign to its thinking.
Henceforward, the technical synthesis of the Traditional Consensus
will be the point of reference for each spurious 'insider.' But always
place special emphasis on the SEC's official definition: The Insider is
"any person.., no matter who [he] may be. "96
Understand, moreover, that the curious construction of the remain-
ing three disparate - even conflicting - definitions, leaves only two
discernible truths: (i) The Court never presents a defined Insider, and (ii)
Only the third - and it was rejected - of the three intimations of an
'Insider,' either individually or in combination, bears any resemblance
to the Public's "any old Tom, Dick or Harry in the land." Or Chairman
Levitt's inclusive analysts. Or the "any person" of the SEC's Cady,
Roberts9 7 and the Compendium.98 And, most of all, to the "any person"
of Section 10(b) itself.
The Second 'Insider': The Powell 'Fiduciary Insider'
The second 'Insider' was referable to the Timorous Powell:
One would think that the first task for an opinion on Insider Trad-
ing would be to define an 'Insider.' But no. Justice Ginsburg's adver-
sions to the nature of the Insider seemed almost inadvertent, as if there
were no need to identify the real malefactor in the Insider Trade.
This left the present path to an 'Insider' a tortuous one, with corre-
sponding difficulty for the reader.
As a helpful guide, three questions and their answers should map
the way. In her first 'attempt' at a definition, Justice Ginsburg relied on
her view of the 'Insider' of Justice Powell in his Chiarella99 and
Dirks.10o
96. See Bayne, Chestman, supra note 5, at 109.
97. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961) (emphasis added).
98. Bayne, The Essence, supra note 5, at 352-53, and supra, text accompanying note 94.
99. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
100. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
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This choice immediately prompts the three questions: (1) Why did
Justice Ginsburg choose the Powell 'Fiduciary Insider' for her focus?
(2) How could she call this latter-day aberration, "traditional," as she
did?' 01 (3) And finally, what is the explanation for Powell's aberration?
Answer these in order.
(1) The Supreme Court's Latest Word: The Powell 'Fiduciary Insider'
One fact of life explains the preoccupation with the Powell 'Fiduci-
ary Insider:'10 2 Chiarella and Dirks were, and arguably still are, the
Supreme Court's controlling pronouncement. Justice Ginsburg had no
option.
Powell's Chiarella and Dirks have been a brooding presence, long
lowering over the law of Insider Trading. These two opinions account
for most of the long line of errors afflicting the law, notably the defini-
tion of an Insider."°3 Justice Ginsburg was faced with this Powell heri-
tage whether she liked it or not.
But instead of damning Chiarella outright, she waffled - ruled it
inapplicable"°4 to O'Hagan - and thereby in the process removed the
Powell 'Fiduciary Insider' from the Court's holding.
All that explains the Ginsburg 'preoccupation'with what she cava-
lierly called "the Traditional Consensus."
(2) A Truncated View of History
Thus Justice Ginsburg was understandably trapped with the Court's
nouveau 'Insider' bequeathed by Powell. Nothing to do but discuss it,
and do her best to reconcile it with her about-to-be-endorsed Misap-
propriator 'Outsider.' But that unfortunate predicament did not explain,
or justify, her next untenable move.
What could have prompted Justice Ginsburg to call Powell's brand-
new 'Fiduciary Insider' the product of "the 'traditional' or 'classical'
theory of insider trading liability"?"°5 The law of Insider Trading began
90 years ago. Powell broke with the tradition in the 1980s.
Is this duplicitous revisionism? Or is Justice Ginsburg merely
naively ingenuous in ignoring the long line of precedents that began
with Strong v. Repide'016 in 1909, the Supreme Court's first Insider Trad-
ing case. The tradition crystallized with the definitive SEC case, Cady,
101. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651-52.
102. Id. at 660-61.
103. See Bayne, 'Fiduciary' Fallacy, supra note 5; Bayne, Dirks, supra note 5.
104. See O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 n.5, 661-62.
105. Id. at 651.
106. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
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Roberts,"7 in 1961. Cady, Roberts was followed by 20 years of District
and Circuit opinions, notably Texas Gulf Sulphur"8 and Merrill
Lynch.1°9
These decades produced the "any person.., no matter who [he]
may be." This was the heart of the truly Traditional definition.
To the contrary, Chiarella10 in 1980 - and Powell's companion
Dirks. t t in 1983 - rejected the Classical tradition, repudiated it. And
surely did not represent it.112 Chiarella was an aberration.
Whether one views this historical lapse as scholarly ignorance or
deliberate revisionism, the clear fact remains: Justice Ginsburg certainly
drifted far from the truly traditional 'Tom, Dick or Harry' of the SEC
and the pre-Chiarella courts. Rather, this was her own untraditional
view.
(3) Powell's Breach with History
But the ultimate culpability lay with Justice Powell. It was he who
ignored tradition. Justice Ginsburg was the 'innocent' pawn of stare
decisis.
Her sin was the refusal to repudiate Chiarella, invalidate the Mis-
appropriation Theory and its Misappropriator 'Outsider.' And get on
with cleaning up the pre-Powell fallacies.
Which understandably inspires the question: Why did Powell him-
self flout 70 years of relative consensus? His errancy lay not with his-
torical deficiency or conscious twisting of the past. Rather, his arguably
was an excess of virtue. His mercy was unbounded, even extending to a
denial of the rights of the defrauded Victims of Insider Trades. But the
Vinnie Chiarellas, Michael Milkens, Ivan Boeskys of the world he inex-
plicably absolved. Or at least left unpunished, and with their booty still
in their pockets.
Justice Powell could readily intuit the four Parables. 113 He was not
naive. His Vinnie even starred in the second. Yet he could not bring
himself to hold Vinnie liable for lying to his $30,000 buyers.
But view Powell's Chiarella less emotionally and more as a Pow-
ell-partial academic analyst. The Powell 'Fiduciary Insider' can only be
properly judged in connection with its antecedents. It was Powell's
107. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
108. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 976
(1969).
109. Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974).
110. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980).
111. Dirks v. SEC, 681 F.2d 824 (D.C. Cir. 1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 646 (1983).
112. See Bayne, Chiarella, supra note 5; Bayne, Dirks, supra note 5.
113. See supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
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attempt to tailor the all-inclusive "any person, . .. whoever" to fit his
overweening desire to limit insiders to a very, very few people. It made
him nervous to convict anyone of cheating his fellow man.
Why he had no solicitude for those who were bilked can be
explained perhaps by their anonymity. And their numerosity. They
were a nameless mass of unknown traders, on an impersonal exchange,
the distant objects of abstract SEC concern.
Justice Powell probably even thought he was refining Cady, Rob-
erts, mitigating its 'harsh, draconian measures.' Rather, he distin-
guished "any person" into oblivion. One hesitates to suspect that
Powell approved the dog-eat-dog, sharp-trading practices that allowed
Chiarella, Boesky, Milken and countless others to reap illicit fortunes in
the whirlwind of the Exchange. But that nonetheless was the Powell
result.
This threefold prelection provides some understanding of the
brooding presence of the Powell 'Fiduciary Insider.' And gives some
perspective to the Ginsburg preoccupation with the Powell aberration of
the 1980s.
The Two Essentials of the Powell 'Fiduciary Insider'
To accomplish his task of mercy to remove the harshness from the
long-held definition - "any person.., no matter who" - of the SEC's
Cady, Roberts, Powell made two surgical cuts: (i) His limitation to
"corporate insiders," who became (ii) Trusted confidants of the swin-
dled Victim, if their inside information came to them "by reason of"'1 4
their corporate position.
To reach this final narrow ambit, Justice Ginsburg went through
several stages.
(i) The First Narrowing: "Corporate Insiders"
Justice Ginsburg begins with a general limitation on the all-
inclusivity of the Traditional 'Tom, Dick or Harry,' "[a ny person...
no matter who.""' 5 Rather, Justice Ginsburg loosely characterizes the
Powell 'Fiduciary Insider' as exclusively
a corporate insider [who] trades in the securities of his corporation
on the basis of material, nonpublic information.
l1 6
But that Ginsburg narrowing is just the beginning. The small class
114. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228.
115. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 911 (1961) (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5).
116. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651-52 (emphasis added).
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of 'liable' Insiders grows even smaller. Many other, less-inside 'corpo-
rate insiders' are free of culpability for Insider Trading.
(ii) Only Trusted Confidants
The Powell Court had fretted over this narrowing, page after page.
Every fluctuation of the Justices was tracked in the 1994 "Chiarella and
the 'Fiduciary' Fallacy.""' 7 At the end of its long indecision, the Court
concluded with a totally inconclusive pronouncement.
Cave, however. Read this statement closely, because it is the core
of the result of the Powell vacillation, or better, pusillanimity.
Note first, however, that Justice Ginsburg does not quote this fol-
lowing section of Chiarella which was the key to the holding, and is
necessary to an understanding of where Powell was going:
No duty could arise from [Chiarella's] relationship with the sellers of
the target company's securities, for [he] had no [1] prior dealings
with them. He was not their [2] agent, he was not [3] a fiduciary, he
was not [4] a person in whom the sellers had placed their trust and
confidence.' 18
The Timorous Powell was never able to define his 'Insider' any
more explicitly than that. Consequently he left all the later courts with
this tenuous conclusion: Only those 'Insiders' who were (1) the trusted
confidants of the deceived innocent would be liable for lying, as long as
they were (2) also 'corporate insiders.'
That summary statement is an attempt to distill reams of commen-
tary, and a holding that was 6-3, and disputed ever since. Justice Black-
mun, dissenting, expressed the concern of this Article:
The Court continues to pursue a course . . . designed to transform
§ 10(b) from an intentionally elastic "catchall" provision to one that
catches relatively little of the misbehavior that all too often makes
investment in securities a needlessly risky business for the uninitiated
investor.' 19
In addition to the intrinsic unreliability of Chiarella itself, Justice
Ginsburg gave as her source for the two Powell 'surgical cuts,' a lone
quotation: Query whether she had read that Powell prdcis of his think-
ing just quoted above. Here is the Ginsburg source:
"[A] relationship of trust and confidence [exists] between the share-
holders of a corporation and those insiders who have obtained confi-
dential information by reason of their position with that
117. Bayne, Fiduciary Fallacy, supra note 5.
118. Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 232-33 (emphasis added).




A parsing of that sentence gives support to the 'two essentials' of
the Powell 'Fiduciary Insider.'
The "trust and confidence" inures only in "those insiders who
have obtained confidential information BY REASON OF THEIR POSITION
with that corporation."
The 'trusted confidant' becomes so only if and when he is so
'inside' his corporation as to be privy to inside information. He must be
both (1) a 'trusted confidant' and (2) an inside 'Insider.'
The 'Temporary Insider'
However, Justice Ginsburg does seem to include a few less-inside
Insiders - as did Powell in the companion, Dirks - with this:
The [three-year-old] classical [sic] theory applies not only to officers,
directors, and other permanent insiders of a corporation, but also to
attorneys, accountants, consultants, and others who temporarily
become fiduciaries of a corporation. See Dirks v. SEC ... (1983).121
When the O'Hagan Court defined the ambit of Insider to other than
"permanent insiders" it was referring to those in a "special confidential
relationship," "attorneys, accountants, consultants and others."
' 12 2
These were they to whom
[u]nder certain circumstances . . . corporate information is revealed
legitimately [as] to an underwriter, accountant, lawyer, or consultant
working for the corporation .... 123
As a result, Dirks had included - and O'Hagan consequently also
included - them in its definition of Insider, even though they are
"outsiders."
Interestingly, this is only further evidence of the inaccuracy of the
term 'Insider.'
[Tihese outsiders may become fiduciaries of the shareholders. The
basis for recognizing this fiduciary duty is not simply that such per-
sons acquired nonpublic corporate information, but rather that they
have entered into a special confidential relationship in the conduct of
the business of the enterprise and are given access to information
solely for corporate purposes. 
124
120. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. at 228) (emphasis added).
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. Id. (emphasis added).
123. Dirks, 463 U.S. at 655 n.14 (cited by O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652).
124. Id. (emphasis added) (cited by O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652). The absurdity of this
reasoning is exposed in Bayne, Dirks and Bayne, Chestman, supra note 5.
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In the end, according to Justice Ginsburg, the Powell 'Fiduciary
Insider' is even an Outsider, as long as he is in
"a relationship of trust and confidence [with] the shareholders of a
corporation. "125
A less involved and labored explanation - and one more intelligi-
ble and exact - would draw on established rules of agency. These pro-
fessionals act as alter egos of the 'fiduciary insider' and understandably
shoulder all the legal obligations of their assumed positions. They are
reducibly indistinguishable from their principals, and as such are simi-
larly defined. And demand no separate, tortured definition.
The Powell 'Fiduciary Insider' is a direct rebuff to just about every
precedent. To the Public and its traditional 'Tom, Dick or Harry.' To
the SEC and its canonized definition: "Any person.., no matter who
[he] may be." To Chairman Levitt, who would hold liable the Wall
Street analysts and their firms, because "ethically" their misrepresenta-
tion is "just as wrong as if corporate insiders did it. "1126
And who can discern any resemblance of the Powell 'Fiduciary
Insider' to the Compendium's all-inclusive: "The Insider may be any
person. "I7 And most important of all, to the explicit words of the gov-
erning Section 10(b): "[A ny person." In fact, virtually no one would
be liable for that patent fraud, the Insider Trade. Justice Blackmun, dis-
senting, was correct. The Powell narrowing "catches relatively little of
the misbehavior. "
The Court's Elimination of the Powell 'Fiduciary Insider'
Expectably, the Ginsburg Majority gave short shrift to the spurious
'Insider' of Justice Powell and his aberration of the early 80s. In one
clipt phrase, in a footnote to boot, Justice Ginsburg removes the 'Fiduci-
ary Insider' from the O'Hagan holding:
The Government could not have prosecuted O'Hagan under the
classical [Powell] theory, for O'Hagan was not an "insider" of Pills-
bury, the corporation in whose stock he traded. 28
With that, all judicial commentary on the 'Fiduciary Insider' of
Powell joins the few remarks on the Traditional Consensus "any per-
son" of Section 10(b), as merely obiter reflections worthy of later
reflection.
125. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (quoting Chiarella, 445 U.S. 222, 228 (1980)).
126. Paul Beckett, SEC's Levitt Sees More Inside Trades By Stock Analysts, WALL ST. J., Mar.
2, 1998, at C21, col. 1, 1998 WL-WSJ 3484609.
127. Bayne, The Essence, supra note 5, at 352; see supra text accompanying note 94.
128. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 n.5.
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Thus the second of the four Divergent Versions of the 'Insider' is
eliminated from the 'Insider Trading' of O'Hagan.
The Powell 'Fiduciary Insider'
This work of Justice Powell's Chiarella and Dirks held that Only (1) "corporate insid-
ers" who are hence (2) trusted confidants of the Victim, are liable for Insider Trading.
All others, scot-free. Ruled inapplicable by O'Hagan.
The Third 'Insider': The Misappropriator 'Outsider'
As Justice Ginsburg approached head-on this central question of
her Opinion - who is the 'Insider' of this Insider Trading now before
the Court? - consider what she has just done by eliminating the Powell
'Fiduciary Insider' from her Opinion.
As a preface to her most basic problem - defining an Insider pur-
suant to the Theory - rephrase the sharp dilemma she has just set
before herself. Witness this concise syllogism:
First Premise: The Powell 'Fiduciary Insider' has two con-
stricting limitations: He must be both (1) Inside the corporation
whose stock he trades and hence (2) A fiduciary to the trader with
whom he trades. A rara avis, indeed, who will scarce ever be
found.
Second Premise: But James Herman O'Hagan is neither (1) an
Insider nor (2) a Fiduciary.
Therefore: James Herman "could not have [been] prosecuted
[as a Powell 'Fiduciary Insider'], for O'Hagan was not an 'insider'
of Pillsbury, the corporation in whose stock he traded."
' 129
Justice Ginsburg thus ruled out a conviction of James Herman as a
Powell 'Fiduciary Insider.'
With Insider Trading - as the Powell Court saw it - eliminated,
what does the O'Hagan Court propose to do? What other route could
lead to liability? Since James Herman is not guilty under the regnant
law of the Supreme Court, what now?
The split Circuits below - and the legal world in general -
awaited a ruling on an Insider Trading case premised on the interpreta-
tion of Section 10(b) according to the Misappropriation Theory.
O'Hagan came up as an Insider Trading case.
The Justice, therefore, was hamstrung, doubly. First, all observers
had proclaimed James Herman guilty of Insider Trading. Second, his
conviction was founded on only one particular interpretation of Section
10(b), the Misappropriation Theory.
129. Id.
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Here was Justice Ginsburg's sharp dilemma: Either she rules that
James Herman was an Insider guilty of Insider Trading under the Misap-
propriation Theory, or she outlaws the Theory as unable to support a
conviction under Section 10(b).
The Ginsburg Rationalization
Justice Ginsburg, of course, cast her lot with the Misappropriation
Theory. Her task now: Find Insider Trading in the Misappropriation
Theory. And the first step in finding Insider Trading is locating the
Insider. Can she find a Theory Insider, or must she repudiate this third
Insider in her Opinion?
(1) The 'Thief'
In the light of her choice, Justice Ginsburg was faced with the
necessity of drawing all the elements of the 'Insider' from within the
four comers of the Misappropriation Theory.
The Source of the 'Insider' Definition: The Theory Itself
The first Article of this Study of O'Hagan reached the conclusion
that the Misappropriation Theory, although long since exactly defined
by the courts, was nonetheless an artfully worded concoction that
appeared superficially straightforward, but was on analysis deliberately
confusing, even misleading. It seemed simple enough, but really was
difficult to penetrate.
The uniformly accepted statement of the Theory, crystallized by the
Circuits since the mid-eighties, was the only version before the five con-
flicted Circuits below and the definition under which James Herman
O'Hagan was convicted and which is now under discussion by the
Supreme Court.
Unedited and unannotated, herewith the Misappropriation Theory
sent up from the Eighth Circuit below:
Those courts that have adopted the misappropriation theory With
which we are concerned in this case have read section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5 to authorize the criminal conviction of a person who "(1) mis-
appropriates material nonpublic information (2) by breaching a duty
arising out of a relationship of trust and confidence and (3) uses that
information in a securities transaction, (4) regardless of whether he
owed any duties to the shareholders of the traded stock."
' 130
The first Article of this Study found nothing misleading with the
130. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995) (quoting SEC v. Clark, 915 F.2d
439, 443 (9th Cir. 1990)) (emphasis added).
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first three of the definition's essentials. They seemed honest enough.
But the fourth was perplexing.
At a second and third reading, the meaning was still elusive. As a
result, parsing was employed, and Webster's called in for help. After
many paragraphs of dissection and analysis,13 1 the phrase was translated
into English with this more revealing result. The original version,
(4) regardless of whether he owed any duties to the shareholders of
the traded stock.
next became this more intelligible rendering:
(4) without taking into account whether the Insider owed any duty to
the public Investor.'
32
Which readily became, by elemental extrapolation:
The misappropriation theory authorizes the criminal conviction of a
person (4) without taking into account whether the Insider owed any
duty to disclose to the Investor, deceived the Investor, or harmed the
Investor with whom he traded the stock. Liability is present in any
case.
The Theory Emasculated
This innocent little section threw the entire thrust of the Theory into
reverse. The Theory (1) required a theft of secret information, (2) by a
fiduciary, and then (3) the use of the secret "in connection with" a stock
trade. Well enough.
But then, in (4), it turns out that the stock trade of (3) is an irrele-
vant appendage. The stock trade could be totally innocuous. Totally
useless. The Investor in the trade need not be deceived, not be harmed
at all. The information could be 'used,' "without taking into account"
whether any Investor was bilked or not.
With this correct understanding of the role of the Insider in the
Theory version of Insider Trading, proceed to consider the Ginsburg
approach, as best discernible, to the definition of an Insider according to
the Theory.
Justice Ginsburg did not directly address the question: Who, or
what, is the Insider, according to the Theft-of-Information concept? But
that did not deter her from dilating at length about Insider Trading. But
who this 'Insider' is - he who 'trades' - can be gleaned only with
difficulty from two sources: (1) a few direct statements that approach a
'definition,' and (2) inferential reasoning from her overall presentation
of the new Theft-of-Information tort.
131. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory Ignored, supra note 1, at 17-22.
132. Id. at 22-23.
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Emphasize that the Justice is now only concerned with the 'Insider'
according to the Misappropriation Theory.
The opening paragraph of the Opinion typifies the inattention given
to the Insider. This impression of inattention persists throughout. The
identity and nature of the guilty person in the Insider Trade is of little
importance.
The Court poses the question to be adjudicated:
Is a Person who trades in securities for personal profit, using con-
fidential information misappropriated in breach of a Fiduciary
Duty to the Source of the Information, guilty of violating § 10(b)
and Rule l0b-5? 33
No mention of an Insider. Is this "Person who trades" the "any per-
son" of the Traditional 'Tom, Dick or Harry'?
When the Justice later sets off the Powell 'Fiduciary Insider' from
the Misappropriator 'Outsider,' she comes closest to explicitness and
reiterates the seemingly all-inclusive generic 'person':
The "misappropriation theory" holds that a person [i.e., the 'insider']
... violates § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, when he misappropriates confi-
dential information for securities trading purposes, in breach of a
duty owed to the source of the information.
1 34
Thus the malefactor in the Insider Trade is first and foremost a Thief of
the Information. That would seem to be an unqualified identification of
the 'Insider' about whom all are concerned, and Mr. O'Hagan would be
he, the "person" who "misappropriates," that is, steals, "confidential
information."
Thus, so far her Theory has no 'Insider' at all. Only a Thief from a
Source, i.e., a Misappropriator.
(2) The "Outsider" 'Insider'
Once the Justice has identified her 'Insider' as a Thief a Misap-
propriator, she then has but one step more to complete her definition,
such as it is. Recall that Powell emphasized that his 'Fiduciary Insider'
was just that, an "insider":
The classical [that is, Powell's nouveau] theory targets a corporate
insider's breach of duty to shareholders with whom the insider
transacts. 135
But Powell and his 'Fiduciary Insider' are anathema to the Theory and
hence to the Justice.
133. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647 (emphasis and capitalization added).
134. Id. at 652 (emphasis added).
135. Id. (emphasis added).
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So Justice Ginsbury consciously sets off, willy-nilly, her "fiduci-
ary" against the Powell 'Fiduciary Insider' by stressing that
[The misappropriation theory outlaws trading on the basis of non-
public information by a corporate "outsider" [who breaches] a duty
owed not to a trading party, but to the source of the information.13 6
So now it is known that the "person" who "violates § 10(b)" and
the law of Insider Trading is not an Insider at all, but an "Outsider."
And since he has already been established as a Misappropriator, he obvi-
ously becomes a Misappropriator 'outsider.' Moreover, he owes no
duty to the "trading party," the Investor. Which, of course, is exactly
the conclusion reached in the labored parsing of Item (4).
It is also now abundandtly clear that the Theft-of-Information
'Insider' is not the all-inclusive "any person" of the Traditional 'Tom,
Dick or Harry' consensus.
One further point: Whatever Justice Ginsburg may call the 'Insider'
of her 'Insider Trade,' she too should be ready to proclaim the word a
total misnomer.
Because the Justice never set out ex professo to define the nature
and qualities of the central actor in her never-mentioned Insider Trade,
these two are the only characteristics that are readily discernible: Thief
and 'Outsider.'
The later sections of this Study will fill in some further insights as
to what this Misappropriator 'Outsider' might be like.
But Justice Ginsburg does stress the point now being proven: The
malefactor of the Theory is not "a corporate insider" who is the Insider
of history, or even of Justice Powell. Rather he is a Thief and an
'Outsider.'
The Theory has, according to the court, no Insider at all. Thus does
Justice Ginsburg, step by step, emphatically eliminate the third Diver-
gent Version of an Insider.
(Note too that the Ginsburg Court, as now next will be emphasized,
never gives the Misappropriation Theory any real support - lip service
at best. Even if she had genuinely adopted the Theory, she would none-
theless have eliminated the Insider from any Theory she would have
embraced. So she in fact doubly excised any true Insider from her
Opinion.)
136. Id. at 652-53 (emphasis added).
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The Misappropriator 'Outsider'
This creation of the Misappropriation Theory was designed to circumvent Powell's
Chiarella. Substituted 'Theft-of-Information from the Source' for the Insider Trade.
Hence, the Thief became the 'Insider.' Eliminated duty to, deception of, and harm to,
the conned Victim. Endorsed by O'Hagan, without a true definition.
The Fourth 'Insider': The Ginsburg 'Insider'
The analysis now reaches the most subtle section of Ginsburg's
O'Hagan. To read the mind of a Justice in the pages of an opinion is a
perilous task at best. The first Article of this Study nonetheless under-
took this task, and produced two sharp results fundamental to any defini-
tion of the 'Insider': (1) Ginsburg's NEw THEORY Was Unavowed, and
(2) O'Hagan Was a Formal Endorsement of the Misappropriation
Theory.
(1) The Unavowed 'New Theory'
The pitfalls in mind-reading appear immediately. At first, Justice
Ginsburg's construction of her "own misappropriation theory from
whole cloth," in Justice Thomas's words, 37 seemed unwitting, as if she
did not advert to the process. But then the suspicion came that she was
subtly inserting her own valid, foreign-to-the-misappropriation-theory,
rationale for sending James Herman to jail.
But whatever mind-reading conclusion prevails, one controlling
factor emerges: Justice Ginsburg never openly presented or endorsed
her own "novel" New Theory. As Justice Thomas stated:
Whether the ... new theory has merit we cannot possibly tell on
the record before use ... because, until today, the theory has never
existed. In short, the.., new theory is simply not presented in this
case, and cannot form the basis for upholding [James Herman
O'Hagan's] convictions.'38
The upshot: The elements of the New Theory therefore - promi-
nent among them, the Ginsburg 'Insider' - are not the judicial holding
of O'Hagan and are at best a presage of a hoped-for future Ginsburg
conversion to the true doctrine. O'Hagan contains no Ginsburg
'Insider.'
(2) O'Hagan's Formal Endorsement of the Misappropriation Theory
The legal world - the conflicted Circuits below, the several parties
to the litigation, Bench, Bar and Public - uniformly regarded O'Hagan
137. Id. at 687 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
138. Id. at 688-89 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (emphasis added).
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as an Insider Trading case, up on certiorari to test the validity of the
Misappropriation Theory as an interpretation of Section 10(b) as applied
to James Herman O'Hagan's $4-million swindle of public investors by
lying to them as to the true value of their Pillsbury stock.
And that was exactly what Justice Ginsburg gave the legal world: A
formal, judicial endorsement of the Misappropriation Theory:
We agree with the Government that misappropriation, as just
defined, satisfies § 10(b)'s requirement .... 9
The result of these two conclusions leaves the Ginsburg 'Insider'
without judicial support and effectively eliminated from O'Hagan.
The Ginsburg 'Insider'
Inferences point to an 'Insider' redolent of 'Tom, Dick or Harry,' but Ginsburg's New
Theory never overtly attempted an explicit definition. Value: Obiter statements for
future argumentation.
The obiter insertions by Justice Ginsburg, however, are worthy of
study, perhaps more so than her other statements, as a possible future
course of the Court. With the three dissenters, Scalia, Thomas and the
Chief, and the imminent retirement of Stevens, Justice Ginsburg could
soon join a rational majority.
Fully cognizant of the totally obiter nature of the Ginsburg
'Insider,' what manner of being did the Justice produce? Is he to be all-
inclusive, as the "any person" of the Code? Or the narrow 'corporate
insider' who must also be a 'trusted confidant' of his conned victim?
The Amalgam of Ginsburg Thinking
The first Article of this two-part Study 40 culled the Opinion and
pieced together key statements into a mosaic of controlling thinking -
an Amalgam of the tenets of her new theory - that arguably served as
the justification of James Herman's conviction for Insider Trading.
Whereas the unqualified and unaltered Theory itself was foreign to
Section 10(b) and its common-law-deceit base, Justice Ginsburg slipped
in enough orthodoxy to warrant James Herman's incarceration.
The collection of the Court's verbatim pronouncements produced
this synthesis:
The Amalgam
The Ginsburg New Theory outlaws:
139. Id. at 653 (emphasis added).
140. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory Ignored, supra note 1.
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(1) Trading on the basis of nonpublic, confidential informa-
.tion, (2) By an outsider to a corporation
(3) To gain no-risk profits - that is, (4) the Investor's dis-
advantage stems from contrivance, not luck and cannot be over-
come with research or skill -
(5) Which is a self-serving abuse that will affect the corpora-
tion's security price when revealed to Investors,
(6) With resultant harm to Investors.
(7) Finally, the fraud is consummated only when he uses the
information through securities transactions.141
The question now: What definition of an 'Insider' do these obiter
words of Justice Ginsburg yield?
The Two-Source Definition of the Ginsburg 'Insider'
The Amalgam was prepared to present the Majority's true thinking
on the correct application of Section 10(b) to the decades-old scam of
the Insider Trade. That Amalgam contained all the essentials of the
traditional Section- 10(b) 'deceit' action.
But the definition of the Insider himself is only one of these essen-
tials. The scrutiny on the Amalgam, therefore, must be narrowed for
present purposes to those words which impinge directly on the nature of
the Insider as such. Some further emendation yields only these direct
relevancies:
The Ginsburg New Theory outlaws:
Trading on ... confidential information, by an outsider.., to
gain no-risk profits . . . with resultant harm to Investors.
[T]he fraud is consummated only when he uses the informa-
tion through securities transactions.
This distillate permits some worthwhile conclusions. Toward
orderliness, these conclusions may be appropriately approached accord-
ing to their twofold Source: (i) Explicit References to an Insider and (ii)
Construction by Deduction.
Surprisingly, this brief analysis yields some unexpected and valid
insights.
(i) Explicit References to an Insider
Throughout her Opinion the Justice consistently refers to the male-
factor of the Insider Trade as "an outsider to a corporation." The later
reference to the "he" who "uses the information" is obviously that same
"outsider." No other direct reference to the malefactor occurs.
141. Id. at 54.
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Which leads to the obvious question: Who is this "outsider"?
What is his real persona? What weight must be given to this lone
explicit usage? Does the New Theory cover no one else?
Two factors probably carry the key to the puzzle of the Ginsburg
'outsider.'
The Pall of Powell
The most revealing influence on the Ginsburg terminology is the
looming presence of Mr. Justice Powell. Recall the emphasis that was
placed on the continuing impact of Chiarella and Dirks on the definition
of the Insider. These two holdings are the current law, the latest word of
the Court. And these Opinions were explicit: The Insider must be
'inside the corporation' and hence the 'trusted confidant' of the Victim
of the scam.
Yet O'Hagan held:
The Government could'not have prosecuted O'Hagan under the
[Powell reasoning], for O'Hagan was not an "insider" of Pillsbury,
the corporation in whose stock he traded.
14 2
So Justice Ginsburg was hamstrung. She was forced to conform, or
overrule Chiarella. She chose lip service. Willy-nilly, her 'insider' had
to be called an 'outsider.'
But arguably, 'outsider' was pure expediency. All Justice Gins-
burg intended was (a) To affirm O'Hagan's conviction, (b) To avoid the
negative effect of Powell and Chiarella - which would free James Her-
man - and (c) call him anything that would be consonant with that twin
objective. Remember, too, the malefactor under the Misappropriation
Theory has consistently been the 'Thief Outsider.'
Close scrutiny of O'Hagan supports the thesis that the Majority
was not concerned with any broader, unforeseen and unintended conse-
quences of such a delimitation. Only the immediate task at hand was in
focus: Convict O'Hagan and distinguish away the miserable Chiarella.
The Opinion carries no evidence that the Majority paused long enough
to face the question. The treatment was strictly ad hoc.
The matter was far different in the earlier, more thoughtful cases,
pre-Theory. The SEC in its 1961 Cady, Roberts143 - "a case of first
impression and one of signal importance in our administration of the
Federal securities acts" 1 - saw the serious implications of the com-
pass of the Insider.
142. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 653 n.5.
143. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907 (1961).
144. Id.
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The Commission was painstaking. Section 10(b) and companion
legislation, the SEC held, applied
to securities transactions by 'any person.' Misrepresentations will
lie within their ambit, no matter who the speaker may be.145
And the Second Circuit expatiated on Cady, Roberts in Texas Gulf
Sulphur:
Insiders, as directors or management officers are, of course, by this
Rule, precluded from so unfairly dealing, but the Rule is also applica-
ble to one possessing the information who may not be strictly
termed an "insider" within the meaning of Sec. 16(b) of the Act.
Cady, Roberts, supra. Thus, anyone in possession of material inside
information must ... disclose it to the investing public .... 146
And:
The essence of the Rule is that anyone ... trading ... in the securi-
ties of a corporation . . . [has a duty] "to those with whom he is
dealing," i.e., the investing public. Matter of Cady, Roberts. 14
7
But Justice Ginsburg never felt the necessity of an exact definition
of the malefactor in the Insider Trade. Arguably, therefore, her explicit
words should not bind her. Her true, inner meaning can best be divined
by the far-more-revealing, and operative, words of the Amalgam.
(ii) Construction by Deduction
By some deft reasoning - the ensuing sections of this Study will
expand these thoughts - Justice Ginsburg could be justly accused of
being on the brink of endorsing both Cady, Roberts and Texas Gulf
Sulphur. The first Article of this O'Hagan Study certainly reached this
conclusion. 14 8
Unfortunately, however, for the present state of the law, O'Hagan
never overtly adopted the Amalgam. Rather, the Opinion expressly,
albeit only nominally, embraced the Misappropriation Theory, thereby
repudiating any such subliminal sentiments of Justice Ginsburg.
A close look at the Amalgam justifies four conclusions: (i) The
"trading on confidential information" is 'outlawed.' (ii) The 'profits'
were not the result of market savoir, but were 'no-risk.' Thus trade was
not at market, and not innocent. (iii) The 'harm' was 'to the Investor,'
not to the Source, Grand Met or Dorsey. (iv) This was 'deceit' of an
Investor in a stock scam, not a Theft from an employer.
145. Id. at 911.
146. SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 848 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
976 (1969) (emphasis added).
147. Id. (quoting Cady, Roberts, 40 S.E.C. at 912).
148. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory Ignored, supra note 1.
[Vol. 53:423
INSIDER TRADING
Such a series of premises leads only to a swindle personified in the
Parables. Surely a Majority that embraces such reasoning would not
inexplicably limit the ambit of liability for such an Insider Trade to an
Insider who would not include "any person, no matter who the speaker
may be."
With this removal of the fourth of the Divergent Versions of the
Insider, 0 'Hagan has correspondingly eliminated that first, and arguably
paramount, essential of the Insider Trade, the Insider himself. Without
an Insider, scarcely an Insider Trade.
But what of the second essential according to the Misappropriation
Theory?
II. THE ABSENCE OF 'DECET' IN THE 'THEFT'
Recur to the Thesis of this Article:
That the Supreme Court in O'Hagan, (1) Abandoned all judicial
consideration of the tort of Insider Trading, and (2) Substituted an
ancient crime, Theft, in its place.
And then to the Subthesis:
Because each individual essential to an Insider Trade is lacking, the
totality of Insider Trading is, eo ipso, lacking.
The first essential was missing: The Insider Trade had no 'Insider.'
The Removal of Deceit
The immediate task now becomes: To show that the Majority has
removed all Deceit from O'Hagan. That this Second Essential to the
Section-l0(b) Insider Trade is absent from the Theory's Theft-of-Infor-
mation crime espoused in O'Hagan.
The Reasoning Pushed to the Basics
To accomplish this 'immediate task,' the argumentation must
explore more precisely five seemingly obvious truths. In the past, these
truths have been taken for granted as if apparent to all. But they have
not been, and their clarification and illumination remains crucial to the
current Insider Trading crisis.
All five truths conduce to one conclusion: 'Deceit' is integral to a
true Insider Trade, yet nowhere in O'Hagan is 'Deceit' to be found.
The reexamination is fivefold: A. Deceit, the Essence of the
'Insider Scam,' B. The Long-Accepted Meanings of 'Deceit' and
'Theft,' C. The 'Deceit' Requisites of the Section-10(b) Action, D. The
Twisting of 'Deceit' into 'Theft,' E. Latent Illogicalities in the Theory's
'Deceit.'
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A. 'Deceit,' the Essence of the 'Insider Scam'
The central subject under litigation in O'Hagan is concededly an
'Insider Trade.' Everyone involved has so proclaimed it. Hence the
nature of this 'Insider Trade' in O'Hagan becomes focal.
To this end, the four Parables were meant to transform living law-
suits - living lawsuits, that is, except Chairman Levitt's Market Guru,
living but not yet a lawsuit - into childlike tales, designed to remove
the perceived complexity of a Wall Street deal. These primitive stories
were to be ABC examples of the Insider Trade. Everyone, from Every-
man to Academic, would recognize them as the same elemental scam.
But the Theory, unfortunately, contorted this common con of the
Parables into a complex phenomenon, with none of the essentials, nota-
bly Deceit, of the four simple stories. The contortion of history's Insider
Trade into a 'Theft of Information' requires this reexamination.
The Traditional Insider Trade versus the Theory's 'Theft'
The Theory's subtle contortion - nowhere does O'Hagan in an
above-board statement admit that the Insider Trade has been abandoned
- demands a more explicit counterattack.
The answer to this demand has two parts: First, the 'Theft of Infor-
mation' of O'Hagan will be reduced to its own homey Parable, a 2+2
portrayal of just how the Theory has maltreated the traditional Insider
Trade. Second, this new Fifth Parable will be set off graphically against
an archetype of the art, James Herman, Con Artist.
(1) The Insider Trade of Public Perception
The choice of the perfect paradigm was obvious. James Herman
was ready and waiting. This boxed reproduction should refresh the
recollection:
The Prototypal Insider Trade of History: 1909-1999
James Herman, Con Artist: James Herman O'Hagan, securities lawyer, got wind of the
imminent absorption of Pillsbury, the American household favorite, by the Brit
megafirm, Grand Met. Secretly buying Pillsbury before the press release, and selling
after, James Herman O'Hagan netted an illicit $4 million from uninformed public
Investors. That was the mid-nineties.
James Herman, Con Artist, is a perfect companion to the other
three swindlers, and contains all the well-known indicia of the Insider
Trade, a swindle since stocks first traded. 'Deceit' was at the heart. In
earlier days, buyers were sold an "infertile bull, a house with an inoper-
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able furnace, a car with a cracked engine-block." 149
(2) The Theory's Substitute for the Insider Trade
But now the new 'Insider Trade' emerges with little resemblance to
the Widdie Strong of the first Supreme Court Insider Trade in 1909.150
Or to Markup Vinnie. Or Chairman Levitt's Market Guru. Or, most
remarkably, to James Herman, Con Artist. The new creation is devoid
of all Deceit.
The truth is that the O'Hagan crime, according to the Theory, is
simply not an Insider Trade at all. The Theorists even avoid calling it
an 'Insider Trade.' To them it is 'Misappropriation of Information.'
To others: Theft of Information. In fact the so-called crime in
O'Hagan is not even Theft. It is nothing other than Snooping by a per-
son who has no right to pry into private matters.
A distant relative of this O'Hagan malefaction could be Theft of
Intellectual Property. Or the Taiwanese 'knockoffs' of Movados,
Rolexes and Polos By Ralph Lauren. Or the Mainland's pirated CDs,
videos and tapes.
Which led to the present conclusion that the Snooping, according to
the Theory, deserved its own 2+2 portrayal. Herewith the 'Section 10(b)
Insider Trade' as O'Hagan saw it:
The Prototypal 'Insider Trade' of O'Hagan: 1980
Willie 'Sutton' Smythe, 'Outsider': For three decades a second-assistant teller at
stodgy Wheat City Bank, disgruntled and disloyal, Willie 'Sutton' Smythe earned his
nom de guerre in one midnight visit to the vaults, made off with $151,500 in cash,
bonds and, in spite, two files, 'Top Secret': Plans of the new building, and Details of
the consummated-but-unannounced takeover of crosstown Wellington Bank.
Now affluent, Willie sank $150,000 in a new home. But he had made good use of
the secrets of the Wellington takeover. He reasoned: Banks make good targets.
Upshot: Willie 'Sutton' put the $1,500 in statewide Topeka MegaBank, at market.
MegaBank finally dropped 12 point. Willie was proud of the result of his study of the
takeover file: No losses.
Clearly, Willie 'Sutton' Smythe, 'Outsider,' is on all fours with the
Misappropriation Theory: (1) Willie misappropriated the material, non-
public information of the takeover of Wellington, (2) Thus breaching his
duty to his 'trusting' Wheat City, (3) Then he used the secret details of
the merger to conclude that bank stocks in general look surefire. (4) All
this without any deception, breach of duty or harm to the public Inves-
tor. Willie had no connection whatsoever with Topeka MegaBank, and
his trade was innocent and at market.
149. Id. at 3.
150. Strong v. Repide, 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
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Recall Justice Ginsburg's "prime questions":
[W]e address and resolve...: Is a Person who trades in securities for
personal profit, using confidential information misappropriated in
breach of a Fiduciary Duty to the Source of the Information, guilty of
violating § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5?
151
The Theory's answer for Willie is an emphatic 'yes!' He met every
requisite.
This graphic setoff should clarify the Nature of the Insider Trade.
Which of the two was truly an Insider Trade? Who of the two, Willie or
James Herman, was an Inside Trader? Who of the two deceived whom?
Was Wheat City Bank deceived at all? Or were the Pillsbury sellers the
only real Victims?
The next misconception confusing the current debate is perhaps
even more pernicious. The Theorists have not only contorted the Insider
Trade. They have also done violence to two rudimentary English con-
cepts, long entrenched in the English language and Anglo-Saxon law.
B. The Long-Accepted Meanings of 'Deceit' and 'Theft'
Deep in the short history of the Misappropriation Theory lie buried
two hidden forces that have driven the Theorists to preposterous legal
positions. Expose these forces, and the reason then becomes clear why
the Theory twisted the rigid, canonized concept of Deceit - defined
exactly for centuries - into the equally ancient and rigid crime of Theft.
The Laudable Objective
The first latent force: The Theorists had a well-intentioned determi-
nation to counteract the baneful effects of the illogic of Chiarella. The
Theorists knew that the Vincent Chiarellas of the world were guilty of
common-law 'deceit.' The Theorists saw the absurdity of the Chiarella
ruling that said: 'Vinnie has no duty not to lie.' This realization resulted
in a powering drive to circumvent Chiarella, to finesse that absurdity.
Emboldened by this laudable 'end,' the Theorists succumbed to a
less-than-laudable 'means.' They embraced a second, unstated guiding
tenet, an ancient fallacy:
'The End Justifies the Means'
The Theorists would never admit it, but they are prepared to sell
their souls to the most patently untenable propositions - both legal and
linguistic - in order to concoct a Theory that will catch a James Her-
man, otherwise scot-free under Chiarella. This explains their readiness
151. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 647 (emphasis and capitalization added).
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to appear as illiterate wordsmiths, as well as ignorant of the law, as long
as their laudable end, incarceration of James Herman, is achieved.
These twin forces conjoined to produce the distortion of two
ancient Crimes and two hallowed Words: Deceit and Theft.
The Wellspring of the Illogicality
How remarkable that (1) The malusage and distortion of two well-
defined English Words could aid in (2) The blurring, even contorting, of
two sharply different Crimes. Yet this twin maltreatment has suc-
ceeded - even been straight-facedly applauded - in twisting the
nature of the Insider Trade and the essence of Section 10(b). And
removing the requisite 'Deceit.'
The Need for a Strong Antidote
Yet the deliberate misdefinition of both the Words and the Malefac-
tions has been so persistent that both the philological and legal commu-
nities must be awakened to reality. Oft-repeated falsity cannot become
fashionably acceptable.
The only remedy would seem to be an outspoken and detailed refu-
tation of the twin distortion. The matter may seem trivial and purely
semantic. But witness the mess. Recall the SEC's Ferrarra: "'When
you have to justify common sense rules in the mold of misappropriation,
you get into twisted arcane analysis."'" 52
Toward Clarification and Illumination of the Concepts
A categorical and unqualified truth underlies the twin terms, Deceit
and Theft. This proposition is herewith set for proof:
Nothing in the meaning of the English word Deceit and its counter-
part, the Deceit crime, has any elements whatsoever in common with
the unrelated English word, Theft, and its counterpart crime. The
two concepts are totally foreign, alien to each other.
This may appear to be overkill, but the loose thinking and casual
misuse of the words and terms have been so long overlooked that only a
strong antidote will cure the malady.
The proof of the proposition will proceed in two parts, first the
Words, then the Crimes.
(1) The Disparity of the English Words
The two words, Deceit and Theft, have never in their long histories
152. Sherry R. Sontag, Insider Trading Limited: SEC Tries to Halt Erosion of Rule, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 2, 1992, at 3 (quoting Ralph C. Ferrara, SEC General Counsel, 1978-1981).
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shared essential elements. They are not even first cousins. To be able to
classify them together at all, one must generalize to the point of irrele-
vancy. Both are sins, true, transgressions against the nature of man and
against one's fellow man. But beyond that, nothing in Deceit is in Theft.
Or nothing in Theft is in Deceit. The concepts are mutually exclusive.
Consult the ultimate American authority, Webster's Unabridged,
and juxtapose the two definitions.
de-ceit . . . n . . . [fr. L decepta, fem. of deceptus, past part. of
decipere to deceive] 1: the act or practice of deceiving (as by
falsification, concealment, or cheating) : DECEPTION ... 2 a : an
attempt to deceive a declaration, artifice, or practice designed
to mislead another wily device : TRICK, FRAUD b : any trick,
collusion, contrivance, false representation, or underhand prac-
tice used to defraud another...
syn DECEIT, DUPLICITY, DISSIMULATION, CUNNING, GUILE Can
mean, in common, the quality, act, or practice of imposing on
credulity by dishonesty, fraud, or trickery. DECEIT implies the
intent to mislead and can cover misrepresentation, falsification,
fraud, or trickery of any kind ... 153
The heart of 'deceit' is the purpose to mislead. Nowhere in the defini-
tion is even an intimation of a taking or stealing or misappropriation.
Even the synonyms do not drift over toward 'theft' or 'larceny.'
theft... n... [ME thiefihe, thefthe, thefte, thifte...] 1 a : the act of
stealing; specif : the felonious taking and removing of personal
property with intent to deprive the rightful owner of it b : an
instance of such an act ....
The essential element of Theft is the taking and removing. As with
Deceit, nothing in the essence of Theft entails in any way the purpose to
mislead.
The more comprehensive and famous British counterpart, the
Oxford English Dictionary, concurs regarding Deceit:
deceit... cf. DECEIVE.]
1. The action or practice of deceiving; concealment of the truth
in order to mislead; deception, fraud, cheating, false dealing.
... 1794 S. WILLIAMS Vermont 170 The deceit, knavery, and
fraud of the European traders.
deceive ...
(The literal sense of L. d cip re was app. to catch in a trap, to
entrap, ensnare; hence, to catch by guile; to get the better of by
fraud; to cheat, mislead.)]
153. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 584 (1993).
154. Id. at 2369 (1993).
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2. To cause to believe what is false; to mislead as to a matter of
fact, lead into error, impose upon, delude, 'take in'.
... 1533 LD. BERNERS Huon xxiv. 69 By hys fayr langage he
may dyssayue vs .. 155
And, expectably, Theft:
theft...
1. The action of a thief; the felonious taking away of the per-
sonal goods of another; larceny; ....
... 1300 Cursor M. 15973 ludas. . Of his thift and his felunni,
His moder al he tald. 156
(2) The Distinctiveness of the Two Crimes
As would be expected, the Anglo-Saxon law has tracked the mean-
ings of the English words in defining the torts and their correlative
crimes. Expectably, therefore, the malefactions, Deceit and Theft, like-
wise have nothing in common. Nothing, that is, beyond their sinful
nature. Both are the illegalization of violations of the persons of a fel-
low man and the natural rights possessed by him.
For a hundred years, Black's has been the lawyer's accepted hand-
book for legal definitions. Blackstone, and before him, Henry of
Bracton, confirm the current definitions. 157 Black's, joining Webster's,
gives the coup de grace to the Theory's muddling of Deceit and Theft.
Deceit. A fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice, or
device, used by one or more persons to deceive and trick
another, who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and
damage of the party imposed upon .... 158
Black's goes on to track the essential constituents of Deceit, and
might just as well have been paraphrasing Section 10(b), which is noth-
ing other than codified common-law Deceit:
Deceit. . . . To constitute "deceit," the statement must be untrue,
made with knowledge of its falsity or with reckless and con-
scious ignorance thereof, especially if parties are not on equal
terms, made with intent that plaintiff act thereon or in a manner
155. 4 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 323-24 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, eds. 1989).
156. 17 OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 886 (J.A. Simpson & E.S.C. Weiner, eds. 1989).
157. HENRI DE BRACTON, DE CONSUETUDINIBUS ET LEGIBUS ANGLIAE (George E. Woodbine,
ed. 1915) (c. 1269); WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1778).
Blackstone, in his Commentaries - which inevitably reflected the Blackstone of
the thirteenth century Henry of Bracton, the lawyer-priest through whom all English
law "passed as through a funnel" ....
DAVID COWAN BAYNE, S.J., CONSCIENCE, OBLIGATION, AND THE LAW 16-17 (1966) (quoting Mir-
iam T. Rooney, Borrowings in Roman Law and Christian Thought, 6 THE JURIST 457 (1946)).
158. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 405 (6th ed. 1990).
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apparently fitted to induce him to act thereon, and plaintiff must
act in reliance on the statement in the manner contemplated, or
manifestly probable, to his injury.' 5 9
When the law undertakes to define the crime of Theft, the parallel
with the English word persists. Thus Black's reiterates Webster's:
Theft. A popular name for larceny. The act of stealing. The taking
of property without the owner's consent. . . . The fraudulent
taking of personal property belonging to another, from his pos-
session .. without his consent, with intent to deprive the owner
of the value of the same, and to appropriate it to the use or bene-
fit of the person taking.' 6 °
Blackstone, cogent and precise in his discussion of Theft, identifies
four essential elements:
LARCINY, or theft, ....
SIMPLE larciny then is "the' felonious taking, and carrying away,
of the personal goods of another." This offence certainly commenced
then, whenever it was, that the bounds of property, or laws of meum
and tuum, were established ...
1. IT must be a taking. This implies the consent of the owner to
be wanting ...
2. THERE must not only be a taking, but a carrying away: cepit
et asportavit was the old law-latin ...
3. THIS taking, and carrying away, must also be felonious; that
is, done animo furandi; or, as the civil law expresses it, lucri causa.
4. THIS felonious taking and carrying away must be of the per-
sonal goods of another . 161
The Branches of Theft
Note well: The Theorists have attempted - but are now being
rebuffed - to corrupt the definition of the crime Deceit. But not vice
versa. Why? Because Theft has made it unnecessary. Theft has some
looser subdivisions that lend themselves to the Theorists' machinations
by supplying ready-made alterations suitable for blurring the two crimes,
clearly poles apart in their original state.
Thus Theft has spawned many hybrid forms of "taking and remov-
ing." Robbery is the forcible taking of personalty from the person of the
victim. And 'embezzlement' is the taking of personalty entrusted to
another. Henry of Bracton noted this distinction in the 13th century:
159. Id.
160. Id. at 1477.
161. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 229-33 (1769).
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Theft, according to the laws, is the fraudulent mishandling of
another's property without the owner's consent, with the intention of
stealing, for without the animus furandi it is not committed. I say
'fraudulent' [because] there is also another kind of mishandling with-
out the owner's consent, rapine, which is the same with us as rob-
bery. That is why a robber is a thief a fortiori ....
Black's makes this strikingly clear in this following entry:
Theft by deception. [A] person is guilty of theft by deception if he
purposely obtains property of another by deception.
163
These variants are not pure Theft. They contain an admixture of
elements unrelated to, or in addition to, the core of Theft, the taking
unlawfully. But as between Deceit and pure Theft, no elements exist
common to each. A complete disjunction is present. A perfect
dichotomy.
And most to the present point: Never has the concept Deceit been
corrupted by any essentials borrowed from Theft. No looser subdivi-
sions muddy-up Deceit. The element of 'taking' is totally alien to
Deceit. And so it has been from the medieval period to the present
Webster's.
The Modern Deceit: Section 10(b)
To fail to align the central concern of O'Hagan, Section 10(b),
alongside its lineal antecedent would be inexcusable. Recall Justice
Ginsburg's own statement of the true focus of her Opinion:
Pursuant to its § 10(b) rulemaking authority, the Commission
has adopted Rule lOb-5, which, as relevant here, provides:
"It shall be unlawful for any person...
"(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, [or]
"(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which
operates ... as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
"In connection with the purchase or sale of any security."'
164
Those provisions of Rule lOb-5 track exactly Webster's, the OED,
Bracton, Blackstone and Black's.
Which brings the matter to the third murked-up truth.
C. The 'Deceit' Requisites of the Section-1O(b) Action
The historical unanimity of the courts and commentators makes all
162. 2 BRACTON ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND 425 (Samuel E. Thorne, trans.
1968).
163. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1477 (6th ed. 1990).
164. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 651 (quoting 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1996)).
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the more remarkable the Theory's attempt to stretch Section 10(b) to
include clear-cut Theft within its ambit. And remove the 'Deceit.'
So consistent have the courts been, that the briefest references will
establish the requirements of an action under Section 10(b) of the 1934
Act, and its implementing SEC Rule lOb-5.
The most expeditious and authoritative approach is resort to a stan-
dard law-school-casebook opinion as declarative of the long consensus
regarding Section 10(b).
Ponder these rudimentary requirements in their application in the
four, now five, Parables. Recall, Huddleston,'65 handed down in 1981,
the year of the birth of the Theory, by the Fifth Circuit:
ELEMENTS OF THE CAUSE OF
ACTION UNDER SECTION 10(b)
AND RULE lob-5
The elements necessary to prove a Section 10(b) claim have
been so often applied by the lower federal courts that they can be
stated in black letter fashion. To make out a claim under Section
10(b), which is based on the common law action of deceit, the
plaintiff must establish (1) a misstatement or an omission (2) of mate-
rial fact (3) made with scienter (4) on which the plaintiff relied (5)
that proximately caused his injury.' 6 6
As recently as mid-1998, the black-letter Huddleston has been con-
firmed by the Federal court in Scone.1 67 Note the explicit equation of
common-law Deceit with Section 10(b).
IV. COMMON LAW FRAUD
The requirements of common law fraud are (1) false representa-
tion of a material fact; (2) intent to defraud; (3) reasonable reliance
on the misrepresentation; and (4) damage caused by such reliance.
May Dep't Stores Co. v. Int'l Leasing Corp., 1 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir.
1993). . . . Thus the elements of common law fraud are essentially
the same as those which must be pleaded to establish a claim under
§ 10(b) and Rule lOb-5. See Pits. Ltd. v. American Express Bank
Int'l, 911 F. Supp. 710, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).168
The categorical explicitness of the judiciary makes all the more
unsettling the backdoor twisting of those essentials by the Theory.
165. Huddleston v. Herman & MacLean, 640 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1981), aff'd in part, reversed
in part, 459 U.S. 375 (1983).
166. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 543 (emphasis added).
167. Scone Investments, L.P. v. American Third Market Corp., 1998 WL 205338, FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 90,207 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 1998).




As to the legislature's view of the inner gist of Section 10(b) and its
implementing Rule lOb-5, the position of the originating source of the
law, the SEC, is concisely summarized in the story of the first begin-
nings of the Rule:
It was one day in the year 1943, I believe. I was sitting in my
office in the S.E.C. building in Philadelphia and I received a call
from Jim Treanor who was then the Director of the Trading and
Exchange Division. He said, "I have just been on the telephone with
Paul Rowen," who was then the S.E.C. Regional Administrator in
Boston, "and he has told me about the president of some company in
Boston who is going around buying up the stock of his company from
his own shareholders at $4.00 a share, and he has been telling them
that the company is doing very badly, whereas, in fact, the earnings
are going to be quadrupled and will be $2.00 a share for this coming
year. Is there anything we can do about it?" So he came upstairs and
I called in my secretary and I looked at Section 10(b) and I looked at
Section 17, and I put them together, and the only discussion we had
there was where "in connection with the purchase or sale" should be,
and we decided it should be at the end.
We called the Commission and we got on the calendar, and I
don't remember whether we got there that morning or after lunch.
We passed a piece of paper around to all the commissioners. All the
commissioners read the rule [Rule lOb-5] and they tossed it on the
table, indicating approval. Nobody said anything except Sumner
Pike who said, "Well," he said, "we are against fraud, aren't we?"
That is how it happened.169
To dilate in further lengthy commentary would be wasteful.
'Deceit' was at the heart of Section 10(b), not Theft. Commissioner Pike
called it "fraud," and never even thought of 'Theft of Information.'
D. The Twisting of 'Deceit' into 'Theft'
With the traditional Section-10(b) as a backdrop, trace the
unfolding of the Ginsburg reasoning. The goal: To rationalize a Theory
version of the 'Section 10(b) Insider Trade.' To do her best to make
Willie 'Sutton' look like an Inside Trader. The result: A specious
'Insider Trade,' an Ignotum X, replete with internal inconsistencies.
Advert along the way to the obeisance paid, necessarily, to Section
10(b). O'Hagan is, after all, an Insider Trading case. And is founded
exclusively on Section 10(b).
169. Milton Freeman, Conference on Codification of the Federal Securities Laws:
Administrative Procedures, 22 Bus. LAW. 793, 891, 922 (1967), quoted in Lanza v. Drexel & Co.,
479 F.2d 1277, 1290 n.32 (2d Cir. 1973) (emphasis added).
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Remarkably, in light of her later reasoning, the Justice does admit
that 'Deceit,' or 'Deception' as she calls it, is focal to Section 10(b) and
the litigation:
Deception through nondisclosure is central to the theory of lia-
bility for which the Government seeks recognition.170
Translated: Even under the Misappropriation Theory - the Govern-
ment's 'interpretation' of Section 10(b) - the central requisite is still
the Deceit of the Victim, through nondisclosure of material information,
in connection with a securities transaction.
This surely is redolent of the common-law 'Deceit' of Huddleston
and Scone:
(1) a misstatement or an omission (2) of material fact (3) made with
scienter (4) on which the plaintiff relied (5) that proximately caused
his injury.171
The Metamorphosis
But what ensues? With that opening truth conceded, the Justice
builds the Theory argument, and immediately begins the departure from
both an Insider Trade and Section 10(b). She proceeds to explain the
peculiar manner in which this "central" Deceit shows itself in the Mis-
appropriation Theory.
Cautionary Note
The Theory, as a synthetic construct to finesse Chiarella, has essen-
tially no true element of 'deceit' in its content. But as an attempt to use
Section 10(b) to catch Insiders untouchable under Chiarella, the Theory
was trapped. 'Deceit' was obligatory.
Burdened with this obligation, the Theory pretended that the Theft
of Information really did have 'deceit' in its essence.
Therefore, lacking the presence of any real 'deceit,' the following
Ginsburg attempt to give existence to the nonexistent becomes very
strained. The process is somewhat surreal, and must be recognized as
such.
The Justice injects 'deception' into her specious 'Insider Trade' in
two ways: First, she maintains that the core element of the Theory, the
actual misappropriation - the stealing of the secret information - is a
170. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 654 (emphasis added).
171. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 543 (emphasis added); Scone Investments, L.P. v. American




deceitful act itself. Although the 'taking and removing' is primarily
plain old Theft, this Theft has a deceptive content to it as well, so she
argues.
Second, over and above the allegedly fraudulent taking, a second
element of deception is present: "Feigned Fidelity" on the part of the
'Insider.'
These two elements, so the Court reasons, coalesce to form the
'Deceit' in the 'Insider Trade.' Thus, this "central" Deceit manifests
itself in two ways: (1) In the Theft of the 'Exclusive Use of the Informa-
tion,' and (2) In "Feigning Fidelity," the Principal Deceptive Element.
Unfortunately, neither of the two alleged manifestations upon
inspection proves to have any 'deceit' content at all.
(1) Deceit in the Theft of the "Exclusive Use"
What is the 'deceit' content of this major constituent of the 'Sec-
tion-lO(b) Insider Trade'? Find that content, or discover its absence,
and the issue of 'deceit' in the 'Theft' begins to be solved.
The Justice begins by stating the ultimate fundament of the The-
ory's 'Insider Trade.' She couches it in 'fraud' terms:
Under this theory, a fiduciary's undisclosed, self-serving use of a
principal's information to purchase or sell securities, in breach of a
duty of loyalty and confidentiality, defrauds the principal of the
exclusive use of that information.172
Shorn of surplusage, that reads:
[A] fiduciary's undisclosed... use of a principal's information...
defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information.
Note that the Court has begun the transformation of the simple theft
of a property right into fraud. Instead of saying 'steals,' the Court says
"defrauds." By the simple and untenable use of the word 'defrauds' in
place of 'steals,' 'deceit' is inserted into the act of misappropriation
itself.
The added importance of this 'use of information' lay in its alleged
nature as a property right. The use of information ranked with 'money
and goods' as a right to be protected. It was the stealing of this property
right that now became 'fraudulent,' the first major constituent of the
"deception" that was "central to the theory of liability."
A company's confidential information, we recognized in Carpenter,
qualifies as property to which the company has a right of exclusive
use. 173
172. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (emphasis added).
173. Id. at 654 (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25-27 (1987).
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O'Hagan next introduces the 'Theft of the exclusive use' as 'embezzle-
ment of property,' by further resort to the four-to-four Supreme Court
Opinion in Carpenter. Again 'theft' has become fraud':
The undisclosed misappropriation of such information, in violation of
a fiduciary duty, the Court said in Carpenter, constitutes fraud akin
174to embezzlement ....
To clinch this point, O'Hagan again goes to Carpenter which goes
to another Supreme Court opinion:
[E]mbezzlement [is] "'the fraudulent appropriation to one's use of
the money or goods [add "use of information"] entrusted to one's
care by another.'
'1 75
By the use of the word 'defrauds' the Justice has arbitrarily moved
Section 10(b) from pure 'deceit' to 'deceitful parting-of-goods-from-
another.' That was the metamorphosis.
But the truth is that 'Deceit' has no true deceptive element at all
integral to the Theft of the Information. The substitution of 'defrauds'
for 'steals' was purely gratuitous, without justification.
'Fraud' and 'Theft': Alien Concepts
Yet it has just been shown over many pages that (i) The words, (ii)
The crimes, and (iii) Section 10(b), have all categorically indicated that
no connection exists between 'Deceit' and 'Theft.'
(i) The words, as defined by both the OED and Webster's, are
totally foreign to each other:
de-ceit .. .n ... [fr. L decepta, fem. of deceptus, past part. of
decipere to deceive] 1: . . . DECEPTION ... 2 a : an attempt to
deceive : a declaration, artifice, or practice designed to mislead
another: wily device : TRICK, FRAUD .... 176
And so with its incompatible:
theft ... n ... [ME thiefthe, thefthe, thefte, thifte .. .] 1 a: ... the
felonious taking and removing of personal property with intent
to deprive the rightful owner of it ....
(ii) The crimes track the words. The current Black's speaks for the
medieval Bracton and his disciple Blackstone:
Deceit. A fraudulent and deceptive misrepresentation, artifice, or
device, used by one or more persons to deceive and trick
another, who is ignorant of the true facts, to the prejudice and
174. Id. (citing Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 27 (1987)) (emphasis added).
175. Id. (quoting Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181 (1902)) (emphasis added).
176. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY oF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
UNABRIDGED 584 (1993).
177. Id. at 2369.
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1781damage of the party imposed upon ...
And likewise:
Theft. A popular name for larceny. The act of stealing. The taking
of property without the owner's consent. . . . The fraudulent
taking of personal property belonging to another, from his pos-
session ... without his consent, with intent to deprive the owner
of the value of the same, and to appropriate it to the use or bene-
fit of the person taking.
179
(iii) Section 10(b) and its historic progenitor is summed up in the
Fifth Circuit Huddleston:
The elements necessary to prove a Section 10(b) claim have
been so often applied by the lower federal courts that they can be
stated in black letter fashion. To make out a claim under Section
10(b), which is based on the common law action of deceit, the
plaintiff must establish (1) a misstatement or an omission (2) of mate-
rial fact (3) made with scienter (4) on which the plaintiff relied (5)
that proximately caused his injury."'
Huddleston was brought up to mid-1998 by the Federal Scone.' 8
So a startling revelation has surfaced: According to the Theory, this
'deception,' 'central' to the 'deceit' action of Section 10(b), really lies in
the Theft of the secret from Grand Met. And not in James Herman's lie
to the $4-million public Investors. The twisting has been successful.
James Herman "defrauds [Grand Met] of the exclusive use of" the
news of its takeover of Pillsbury.' 82
The Justice has thereby established the Defrauding of Grand Met as
the gravamen of the new species of a Section-10(b) Insider Trade. All
the 'insider' con men of history, right down to the Vinnies, Milkens and
Boeskys of today, even Willie 'Sutton' Smythe, would be dumbfounded.
Henceforward, 'defrauding' will mean 'stealing.' But 'stealing'
really means 'snooping.'
That concludes the attempted injection of 'Deceit' into the Theft of
the 'Exclusive Use' itself.
(2) "Feigning Fidelity," the Principal Deceptive Element
Justice Ginsburg continues to construct the Theory's peculiar 'Sec-
178. HENRY CAMPBELL BLACK, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 405 (6th ed. 1990).
179. Id. at 477.
180. Huddleston, 640 F.2d at 543 (emphasis added).
181. Scone Investments, L.P. v. American Third Market Corp., 1998 WL 205338, at *10, FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 90,207 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 1998).
182. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (emphasis added).
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tion 10(b) Insider Trade.' Herewith the Theory's second infusion of
'Deceit' into the new 'Insider Trade':
[Tihe deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves
feigning fidelity to the source of information .... 183
The use of that verb "involves" raises questions. The court says
"the deception involves feigning fidelity." '84 Does that mean that the
"deception" - which is "essential to the misappropriation theory" '85 -
consists solely of 'feigning fidelity" and nothing more. That there is a
total absence of 'lying' "to the source of the information?" No outright
'misrepresentation'? Merely feigning fidelity'?
Yet the word "involves" seems to say that the "deception" has a
broader ambit and encompasses more than just 'feigning fidelity." That
'feigning fidelity" is only one collateral facet of the Insider's deception
of the person he hoodwinks. The person hoodwinked, according to the
Theory, is he who has secret information.
But immediately the realization arises: The definition of the Theory
stated that the 'taking and removing property' by the Insider was the
major constituent of the Theory's new 'Insider Trade.' Yet it is clear
that 'taking and removing' does not per se involve any deceit. The con-
clusion is inevitable therefore: If no deceit whatsoever is present in the
major constituent, then the lesser constituent must contain all the
'deceit' that is present in the 'Insider Trade.'
Therefore, 'feigning fidelity" is in no way merely a collateral addi-
tion to "defraud[ing] the principal of the exclusive use of the informa-
tion."' 86 It is the sole 'deceit' element present.
How Essential Is "Feigning Fidelity"?
The nub of the matter then becomes: How important is 'feigning
fidelity" in the 'taking and removing' of the goods of another? Is
'feigning fidelity" integral to the crime of Theft?
The answer to that question has already come from Bracton, Black-
stone, Black's, the OED and Webster's: Repetition would be fruitless.
Nothing' in the meaning of the English word Deceit and its counter-
part, the Deceit crime, has any elements whatsoever in common with
the unrelated English word, Theft, and its counterpart crime. The
two concepts are totally foreign, alien to each other. 1
87
The crime of Theft of Information has no 'deceit' content at all.
183. Id. at 655 (emphasis added).
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 652. (emphasis added).




A vivid answer in summary could come from a brief reflection on
the Fifth Parable - which told the story of an 'Insider Trade' according
to Theory specifications - and also on a prototypal Theory case, the
Seventh Circuit's Cherif.
The penetration of the vaults of First Chicago and Wheat City by
Danny Cherif and Willie 'Sutton' illustrates exactly how intimately
"feigning fidelity" was "involve[d]" in the deprivation of the banks "of
the exclusive use of [their secret] information."
Danny had not even worked for First Chicago for a year. "Feign-
ing fidelity" was far from his mind. Certainly First Chicago did not
conceive Danny's caper as a 'breach of loyalty,' as infidelity. So nonex-
istent was fidelity' that the Seventh Circuit openly opined that "even
mere thieves" would be liable. 188 To First Chicago, it was 'Breaking
and Entering.'
The extent of Willie 'Sutton's' fidelity was equally absent. Neither
he nor Wheat City had any concept of an admixture of infidelity in his
break-in. To both it was a plain old bank heist and required no proof of
'infidelity' or 'breach of fiduciary duty' to establish liability.
Understandably, in any event, the break-in would certainly not be
Insider Trading under Section 10(b). The wrong was Burglary of a
Bank.
The O'Hagan Court tried evidently to twist 'Deceit' into 'Theft' -
calling it an 'Insider Trade' - in two ways: (1) In the actual 'Theft of
Exclusive Use of the Information' itself. But on inspection the Theft
itself proves devoid of all 'deceit.'
And now (2) In the "Feigning Fidelity," the Principal Deceptive
Element, the same had to be said. Thus Justice Ginsburg's rationaliza-
tion of the Theory's 'Section 10(b) Insider Trade' produced no 'decep-
tion' or 'deceit' at all, anywhere.
E. Latent Illogicalities in the Theory's 'Deceit'
"When you have to justify common sense rules in the mold of misap-
propriation, you get into twisted arcane analysis."' 89
- Ralph C. Ferrara, SEC General Counsel, 1978-1981
"[T]he [Supreme Court] decision [in Carpenter] indicated 'pretty
strongly' that the [misappropriation] theory was 'a fairly dubious
proposition.'"190
188. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 412 n.6 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 966 (1992).
189. Sherry R. Sontag, Insider Trading Limited: SEC Tries to Halt Erosion of Rule, NAT'L
L.J., Nov. 2, 1992, at 3 (quoting Ralph C. Ferrara, SEC General Counsel, 1978-1981).
190. Barbara B. Aldave, The Misappropriation Theory: Carpenter and its Aftermath, 49 OHIo
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- Alan Bromberg, Securities Expert, 1987
As Justice Ginsburg proceeded in her construction of the Theory's
new version of the 'Section 10(b) Insider Trade' she laid bare three fault
lines that revealed the chasms of illogic in her attempt to intrude
'Deceit' into the ancient crime of 'Theft.' In O'Hagan she called it Theft
of Information. And said it was 'Insider Trading.'
These three fissures are not claimed to be exhaustive. Undoubtedly
others will surface. But these three serve to emphasize the futility of
trying to insert 'Deceit' into 'Theft.' These are unintended and unenvi-
sioned consequences of the irrationality at the core.
The three illogicalities: (1) James Herman Outfoxes the Theory,
(2) The Paradox of the Uncaused Harm and (3) Property Right? Or
Phantom Possession? The Broken Promise.
(1) James Herman Outfoxes the Theory
A preposterous thought arises. Suppose James Herman O'Hagan
were to have put his securities-law expertise to work, anticipated resort
to the Theory, and posed this devious query to himself: 'Suppose I don't
deceive Grand Met at all? Suppose, instead, some minutes before the
deed, I eliminate the so-called 'deception' required by the Theory for
liability?'
Put James Herman's query into practical terms. Make slight altera-
tions to the fourth Parable, James Herman, Con Artist, 9' and produce
this variant adapted to the Theory:
James Herman, Master Shyster
James Herman faxes Grand Met: "Heard of your takeover, and plan immediate use of
your info toward quick killing in Pillsbury." Outcome: Public sellers yield O'Hagan $4
million.
Analysis: The facts are succinct. James Herman in no way
"defrauds the principal,"192 the Source. Grand Met is fully informed,
completely unharmed. No "feigned fidelity." No "deceptive device."
To the contrary, James Herman lied only to the $4-million Investors.
The deception lay in James Herman's stock trade. But not in the The-
ory's 'malefaction.' Verdict: Not Guilty of Insider Trading.
Undoubtedly that stretches one's credulity, but there it is. Accord-
ing to the Theory and the Majority, a simple fax to Grand Met and
ST. L.J. 373, 374 (1988) (quoting remarks made by Professor Bromberg in Anne P. Donovan,
Supreme Court Upholds Conviction of Former Business Writer Winans, INVESTOR'S DAMn, Nov.
17, 1987, at 1).
191. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
192. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652 (emphasis added).
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neither James Herman's $4-million Investors would have any remedy
under Section 10(b), nor would Grand Met. The $4-million Investors,
unharmed. The Source, Grand Met, unscathed.
Justice Ginsburg explicitly endorses this remarkable result:
Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory
involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary
discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic infor-
mation, there is no "deceptive device" and thus no § 10(b) viola-
tion . ... 193
Note the clear meaning here: If the 'feigned fidelity" is absent,
"there is no deceptive device." Therefore, the 'feigned fidelity" is the
sole deceptive element in the Theory's 'Insider Trade,' because, accord-
ing to the Court, no 'deceit' is present in the Theft itself. So if not in the
feigned fidelity,' 'deceit' is nowhere.
Therefore "the deception essential" does not merely "involve[ I
feigning fidelity. " The "deception essential" is solely constituted by the
'feigned fidelity."
Aliis verbis,
[The] deception... central to... liability 4 [and] essential to... the
theory195 [is constituted solely] by feigning fidelity to the source of
information .... 196
The result of that synthesized premise is the rationale for the innocence
of the Master Shyster:
[Therefore] if the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to
trade on the nonpublic information, there is no "deceptive device"
and thus no § 10(b) violation .... 19'
Government Support for the Illogic
Lest some realist might assume that the logic were all her own, the
Justice continues:
As counsel for the Government stated in explanation of the theory at
oral argument: "To satisfy the common law rule that a trustee may
not use the property that [has] been entrusted [to] him, there would
have to be consent. To satisfy the requirement of the Securities Act
that there be no deception, there would only have to be
disclosure."' 98
193. Id. at 655 (emphasis added).
194. Id. at 654.
195. Id. at 655.
196. Id.
197. Id. (emphasis added).
198. Id. at 654 (emphasis added).
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Later in her Opinion the Justice reiterated her position in order to
remove all doubt, and to emphasize that she saw nothing unusual in
pronouncing James Herman, Master Shyster, totally guiltless in his $4-
million gambit.
(Deeper importance attaches to this reiteration because it addresses
directly one of the two supports to the rejection below of the Theory by
the Eighth Circuit O'Hagan.)
The Court of Appeals rejected the misappropriation theory pri-
marily on two grounds. First, as the Eighth Circuit comprehended
the theory, it requires neither misrepresentation nor nondisclosure.
... As we just explained, however .... deceptive nondisclosure is
essential to the § 10(b) liability at issue. Concretely, in this case, "it
[was O'Hagan's] failure to disclose his personal trading to Grand
Met and Dorsey, in breach of his duty to do so, that ma[de] his con-
duct 'deceptive' within the meaning of [§] 10(b)." Reply Brief 7199
The Court places no 'deception' in the use itself of the information.
It is simply the "failure to disclose his personal trading to Grand Met
and Dorsey." The actual use of the secret - e.g., to cheat the $4-
million sellers - is perfectly legitimate. And with simple disclosure
causes Grand Met no harm.
This is a far-reaching conclusion for the Theory. Without the
'feigning fidelity," all deception disappears. The actual use of the infor-
mation is not integral to the violation of Section 10(b). Nor is consent to
the use. Nor approval of the use. Merely knowledge. Remove the
'feigned fidelity' - that is, 'disclose the plans' - and "there is no
'deceptive device' and thus no § 10(b) violation." A frank and unquali-
fied statement.
But no sooner had Justice Ginsburg fully exonerated the Master
Shyster and let him outfox the Theory completely, than she proceeded to
commit one of the law's more arresting nonsequiturs.
(2) The Paradox of the Uncaused Harm
The Justice fully realized that no tincture of deception was present
in the actual use of the secret information. She had just said so: The
'failure to disclose his personal trading... ma[de] his conduct decep-
tive. ",200 Not the later trading itself. Absent nondisclosure "there is no
'deceptive device' and thus no § 10(b) violation."
That posed a looming problem that surfaced in the very next para-
graph: If no deceit is present in the trading, how can the deceit be in
connection with the trading? She saw the predicament well enough.
199. Id. at 660 (emphasis added).
200. Id. (emphasis added).
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We turn next to the § 10(b) requirement that the misap-
propriator's deceptive use of the information be "in connection with
the purchase or sale of [a] security. 2 °1
With the problem posed, came a perplexing follow-up:
This element is satisfied because the fiduciary's fraud is consum-
mated not when the fiduciary gains the confidential information, but
when, without disclosure to his principal, he uses the information to
purchase or sell securities.2 °2
But the Justice had just said: With full disclosure, "there is no deceptive
device" anywhere. Query: If no deception is present in the trading, what
can nondeceptive trading possibly add of a deceptive nature to an earlier,
wholly distinct act of Theft? 'Nemo dat quod non habet.' 'No one can
give what he has not got.'
But that ancient adage was no obstacle to the O'Hagan Court. The
answer - as the first Article of this two-part Study decried at length
produced the remarkable illogic in her nonsequitur:
"[A] fraud or deceit can be practiced on one person, with resultant
harm to another person or group of persons."
20 3
Lest one question what one reads, the Court rephrases its mind-
stopping position:
This is so even though the person or entity defrauded is not the other
party to the trade, but is, instead, the source of the nonpublic
information.2 °4
Since Justice Ginsburg had borrowed her fallacy from Barbara
Bader Aldave, she hastened to make it her own in a more delicately
framed paraphrase:
A rnisappropriator who trades on the basis of material, nonpublic
information, in short, gains his advantageous market position through
deception; he deceives the source of the information and simultane-
ously harms members of the investing public.2 °5
Once again the Justice fails to explain how 'feigning fidelity" to an
employer "simultaneously harms the investing public." What is the
causal connection?
Remember, from the Theory's earliest days with Newman in 1981,
no fraud needs to be perpetrated on the investing public. And if no
fraud, scarcely could the absent fraud inflict harm. Thus Newman:
The ... statement that fraud perpetrated upon purchasers or sellers
201. Id. at 655-56 (quoting Section 10(b)) (emphasis added).
202. Id. at 656 (emphasis added).
203. Id. (quoting Aldave, 13 HOFs~ RA L. REv. at 120) (emphasis added).
204. Id. (emphasis added).
205. Id. (citing Aldave, 13 HOFSTRA L. REv. at 120-21 & n.107) (emphasis added).
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of securities is a "requisite element under the securities laws" is,
therefore, an overbroad and incorrect summary of the law.
: . , [Tihe language of Rule JOb-5 . . .contains no specific
requirement that fraud be perpetrated upon the seller or buyer of
securities.
20 6
Chestman, the bellwether Second Circuit Theory case, backs up
Newman:
In contrast to Chiarella and Dirks, the misappropriation theory does
not require that the buyer or seller of securities be defrauded.
20 7
Chestman went even further in severing the "resultant harm" from
the Theft and the Source:
The source of the nonpublic information need not be ... in any way
connected to or even interested in the purchase or sale of
securities.
20 8
Justice Ginsburg could well have been beguiled into her paradox by
another early Second Circuit opinion, Materia. Materia at least stops
short of an attempted explanation of the inexplicable:
Even though the defendant owes no duty of disclosure to the pur-
chaser or seller of the securities, the completed fraud (i.e., the misap-
propriation) is deemed to be "in connection with the purchase or sale
of [a] security," because the misappropriated information is thereaf-
ter used in a securities transaction.20 9
The next question would be: What is the nature of this alleged harm
to Investors? Willie 'Sutton' would have been liable under the Theory,
even though his sellers made half a point from their sale. What harm
did Willie inflict by his use of the secret merger details? What harm can
a harmless 'use,' "thereafter," inflict?
What cause of action under the Theory would the "members of the
investing public" have for the "resultant harm" inflicted on them by the
'fraud or deceit... practiced" on the banks by all the Danny Cherifs
and Willie 'Suttons' in burgling the banks?
These questions are all unanswerable, because the ancient adage
does pose an obstacle to this second illogicality. The Paradox of the
Uncaused Harm is intrinsically insoluble.
206. United States v. Newman, 664 F.2d 12, 17 (2d Cir. 1981) (emphasis added).
207. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566 (emphasis added).
208. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 944 (4th Cir. 1995) (citing Chestman, 947 F.2d at
567) (emphasis added).
209. Bryan, 58 F.3d at 944-45 (citing SEC v. Materia, 745 F.2d 197, 202 (2d Cir. 1984)
("[W]hether a defendant has breached a duty to a particular plaintiff' is not "germane" in a
criminal prosecution under section 10(b)), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1053 (1985)) (emphasis added).
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The Final Thrust from Justice Blackmun
The unsuccessful attempt by Justice Blackmun in his Chiarella dis-
sent to save the legal world from the evils of Chiarella has already been
extolled at considerable length.2"' Again, now, his dissent deserves
praise. Justice Blackmun did achieve two goals, both now pertinent: (1)
He repudiated the holding in Chiarella, a repudiation which, remarka-
bly, rarely occurs today. And (2) He serves as a fine conclusion to this
current expose of the illogic in the injection of an ersatz 'deceit' into the
'taking and removing' of property.
... I write separately because, in my view, it is unnecessary to rest
petitioner's conviction on a "misappropriation" theory. [The Theory
was not before the Court.] The fact that petitioner Chiarella pur-
loined, or, to use THE CHIEF JUSTICE'S word, ... "stole," information
concerning pending tender offers certainly is the most dramatic evi-
dence that petitioner was guilty of fraud. . . . But I also would find
[his] conduct fraudulent within . . . § 10(b) . . ., even if he had
obtained the blessing of his employer's principals before embarking
on his profiteering scheme. Indeed, I think petitioner's brand of
manipulative trading, with or without such approval, lies close to the
heart of what the securities laws are intended to prohibit.2"
(3) Property Right? Or Phantom Possession? The Broken Promise
The Court's compulsion to inject some 'deceit' into its version of
the 'Section 10(b) Insider Trade' produced a third inherent illogicality.
Illogic, as does a lie, inevitably spawns an unforeseen and unwanted
progeny.
As an aid in testing this third illogic, view the ensuing story
through the eyes of the main object of Theory solicitude, the principal
Victim of the new 'Section 10(b) Insider Trade,' the Source of the stolen
inside secrets. Grand Met is the center of the new tort. (Not the $4-
million sellers.)
To add realism, extrapolate from the crime of 'Insider Trading' -
a/k/a 'Theft of Information' - its correlative, yet-uncodified tort. And
transpose Grand Met from a Complaining Witness - in a Government
criminal action to protect the common weal - into an aggrieved Plain-
tiff seeking damages from the thief who stole its secrets. Who deceived
Grand Met in an Insider Trade.
210. See Bayne, Chiarella, supra note 5.
211. Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 245-46 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(emphasis added).
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The Tale of the Duped Victim
This is the sad story of the hundreds of Grand Mets of the legal
world who have been gulled by the broken promises of the Misappropri-
ation Theory. The Theory led those Grand Mets - "those who
entrusted others" with access to confidential information - to believe
they would be protected from the faithless fiduciaries who abused them.
The Theory assured those so-called 'owners' that their right to their
secret information would be inviolable. That the Theory would stand
behind "the principal" in his legal right to "the exclusive use of that
information." That "the principal" possessed a cause of action against
a person [who] violates § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5, ... in breach of a
duty owed to the source of the information. 12
The gist of the story is this: The Theory, in the same breath that it
made its promise, broke the promise. The very same tenet of the Theory
that bestowed the solemn right, emasculated the right. Grand Met's
exclusive Property Right was a Phantom Possession. On paper for one
paragraph, but snatched away in the next.
Unfold this story in two parts:
(1) The Promise Given
Justice Ginsburg began to lay out the details of the Theory's prom-
ise by first noting the principal objective of the Theory:
The "misappropriation theory" [recognizes the] duty owed to the
source of the information. See Brief for United States 14.2"3
The Government Brief, speaking for the SEC, expressed the con-
cept similarly:
Under the misappropriation theory of insider trading, [the] fraud
[is] on the source of the information [Grand Met] in a breach of a
fiduciary or similar duty owed to the source.1
14
The primary solicitude of the Theory is directed at "those who
entrusted" others with "confidential information." The duty is to pro-
tect the rights of the Victim, him from whom the secrets are stolen.
And what are the specifics of this solemn promise made by the
Theory?
The Terms of the Promise
The Duty burdening the Theory, therefore, was explicit: To protect
212. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 652.
213. Id.
214. Brief for the United States at 14, O'Hagan, 521 U.S. 642.
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the Grand Mets, the Sources who possessed secret inside information, in
"the exclusvie use of the information."
This first step in the grand delusion was the open assurance that the
Theory is designed to enforce the Duty owed to the Victim of the
'Insider Trade,' the Source of the information.
The Court expresses the breach of this Duty - the violation of
Section 10(b) - in this way:
Under this theory, a fiduciary's undisclosed ... use of a principal's
information in breach of a duty of loyalty and confidentiality,
defrauds the principal of the exclusive use of that information.215
The Right Protected by the Duty
The Theory took great pains to spell out exactly the nature of this
right to "the exclusive use of the information." The "exclusive use of
the information" was a property right. To support this proposition, and
further refine its nature, the Court began with a litany of authority, using
its own earlier pronouncements:
A company's confidential information, we recognized in Carpenter,
qualifies as property to which the company has a right of exclusive
use.
2 16
It then classified 'confidential information' among such tangible
personalty as money and goods, again relying on Carpenter:
The undisclosed misappropriation of such information ... constitutes
fraud akin to embezzlement - "'the fraudulent appropriation to
one's own use of the money or goods entrusted to one's care by
another.' "217
In further explanation the Justice again relies on Carpenter which
in turn relies on its own Grin v. Shine:
[E]mbezzlement [is] "'the fraudulent appropriation to one's use of
the money or goods [add "use of information"] entrusted to one's
care by another."'
218
The Court stressed 'property right' because it was consistent with
the crux of its new 'Insider Trade,' namely, the Theft rather than the
Deceit of the past. The 'inside information' of its 'Insider Trade' as a
property so tangible that it could be 'stolen,' just as could "money or
goods."
The idea behind that stratagem was to create a new wrong totally
215. Id. at 652 (emphasis added).
216. Id. at 654 (emphasis added).
217. Id. (quoting Carpenter, 484 U.S. at 27, quoting in turn Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181, 189
(1902)) (emphasis added).
218. Id. (quoting Grin v. Shine, 187 U.S. 181 (1902)) (emphasis added).
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distinct from the con of the old-time Insider Trade which consists of
lying about the true value of stock. Tangible personalty was 'stealable.'
'Taking and removing' goods - or the use of information - was genu-
ine stealing. But mere 'lying' was not. A big difference.
The Formal Guarantee of a Property Right
The Source has been assured repeatedly: Grand Met has an ironclad
property right to the Exclusive Use of its secret information. A new tort
law has been created to protect the new right. The tort will be called
'Insider Trading' so it can be fit into the old Section 10(b).
But really it will be the Theft of Property. This tort protects the
right to the exclusive use of the secret information. Hence, if anyone
steals that property, uses it without permission, or without full approval,
Grand Met as Plaintiff may adduce in a legal action the harm suffered in
the unapproved use. That is the main promise made by the Theory to all
the Victims of this new, specious 'Insider Trade.'
That should express quite clearly the nature and seriousness of the
promise given by the Theory to the Victims, the chief beneficiaries of its
new Section 10(b).
(2) The Promise Broken
But no sooner had these words been uttered, than the Theory was
forced to welsh on its formal promise of a guaranteed property right to
the Exclusive Use of its information.
The Theory was trapped by a legal compulsion: The strictures of
fifty years of the 'deceit' of the common law at the heart of Section
10(b). Hence, Justice Ginsburg was compelled to write:
Deception through nondisclosure is central to the theory of lia-
bility for which the Government seeks recognition.219
This is the prime constituent of both the common law and Section 10(b).
The Justice followed that up by analyzing the Deception's content:
[T]he deception essential to the misappropriation theory involves
[read: 'is solely constituted by'] feigning fidelity to the source.22°
This was the legal compulsion that led the Theory, willy-nilly, into this
third illogic. The pity is that the Theorists did not take the time to ask
whither the compulsion would lead them. Had they thought the matter
through, perhaps the Theory would have died aborning, or been aborted.
But the fact is that the insertion of 'Deceit' as a constituent of the
219. Id. (emphasis added).
220. Id. at 655 (emphasis added).
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misappropriation itself was the prelude to the broken promise. How?
Consider the ramifications, the consequence of this tenet of the Theory.
Remove the Deception, Liability Disappears
If "nondisclosure is central to liability," then it follows inexorably
that with disclosure, liability is absent.
Justice Ginsburg put this syllogism into explicit words:
Because the deception essential to the misappropriation theory
involves feigning fidelity to the source of information, if the fiduciary
discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the nonpublic infor-
mation, there is no "deceptive device" and thus no § 10(b) viola-
tion .... 221
This succinct presentation put the final imprimatur on the third gaffe.
Mere Disclosure Cancels the Property Right
The logic is incontrovertible. If liability for the tort disappears, the
rights protected by the tort disappear. And the solemn property right to
the Exclusive Use of the confidential information disappears as well.
So the Theory did not mean it when it assured the Grand Mets of
the legal world that they had a property right to exclusive use. Rather
they had only a right to the "undisclosed... use." They had no right to
the "[ ]disclosed ... use."
Those words were explicit. All the embroidery of a property right
akin to "money or goods" was misleading.
Nothing could be more disastrous for the gulled Source. The mere
disclosure of the plan to use the secrets removes all claim to the right.
All James Herman needed to do was fax Grand Met:
"Heard of your takeover and plan immediate use of your info toward
quick killing in Pillsbury."
- James Herman, Master Shyster
With that, Grand Met's 'property right to the exclusive use of the secret
information' has evanesced.
In fact, Grand Met, and all the duped Sources who are relying on
the Theory, now find that their property right was a Phantom. That
what they had been promised - and presumably, albeit gullibly, on
what they relied - was nothing other than a delusion, a fleeting 'pos-
session,' on paper for a paragraph, but snatched away in the next:
[If the fiduciary discloses to the source that he plans to trade on the
nonpublic information, there is no "deceptive device" and thus no
221. Id. (emphasis added).
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§ 10(b) violation ....222
The Theory does not explicitly require anything more than mere
disclosure of "plans to trade on the nonpublic information." Remove
the "deceptive device" and hence "no §1O(b) liability." There is no
requirement of permission to use the information. Or of Grand Met's
approval of the Insider's invasion of Grand Met's property right. No,
Justice Ginsburg emphasizes the point, quoting the Government on
behalf of the SEC:
"To satisfy the requirement of the Securities Act that there be no
deception, there would only have to be disclosure."'223
Since no deception is present in the trade, and mere disclosure
removes deception from the 'taking and removing' of the Exclusive Use,
mere disclosure removes all deception, and hence all liability for the
actual use of the secret information.
The upshot? Behind Grand Met's back, the solemn promise to pro-
tect the property right - canonized in the opening words of the The-
ory - has been emasculated completely, rendered useless by a second,
incompatible, conflicting, prescription.
The guarantee of a property right to the exclusive use was illusory.
The so-called 'right' was transitory, a Phantom Possession.
These three illogicalities are lesser buds on the parent tree, true.
But they nonetheless coalesce to form a collective pronouncement: No
true 'deceit' is present in the Theory's new version of a 'Section 10(b)
Insider Trade.' A 'deceit' that is triply riven with illogic cannot be the
genuine article.
All of which arguably completes this division of the Subthesis: To
show that the Second Essential to the 'Section 10(b) Insider Trade,'
Deceit, is absent from the Theory's Theft-of-Information crime as
espoused in O'Hagan.
The first absent essential was the Insider himself. But now, what
of the third? Which just happens to be a nonessential addition and a
pernicious intrusion?
III. THE INEXPLICABLE INTRUSION OF A 'FIDUCIARY DUTY'
Recur to the Thesis of this Article:
That the Supreme Court in O'Hagan, (1) Abandoned all judicial
222. Id. (emphasis added).
223. Id. at 654 (quoting the Government in Transcript of Oral Argument 12) (emphasis added).
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consideration of the tort of Insider Trading, and (2) Substituted an
ancient crime, Theft, in its place.
The first essential: The 'Insider' of the Insider Trade. The second:
'Deceit.' Both were missing.
Now with this third departure from the canonized tort of Insider
Trading, the Theory has altered both history and the nature of the
Insider Trade by the Inexplicable Intrusion of a 'Fiduciary Duty.'
'Fiduciary Duty' and the Chaos Its Presence Has Wrought
Before embarking on the analysis of the curious intrusion of the
fiducial into the simple concepts of, first, 'deceit' - no one ever
thought a person had to be a 'trusted confidant' to be 'deceitful'! - and,
then, 'theft' - no one ever thought a person had to be a 'thief' to be
deceitful - consider the confusion that this intrusion has visited on Sec-
tion 10(b) Insider Trading. With such a background, an orderly consid-
eration will be possible of the role that 'fiduciary duty' has been given to
play in the Theory.
Two revealing pronouncements of the Court adequately express the
Theory's position on the matter. Many supporting citations as well are
scattered throughout O'Hagan, this Article and other Theory opinions.
Begin with this Ginsburg statement, speaking of the Insider Trade,
to lay the groundwork:
Under the misappropriation theory. . ., the disclosure obligation
runs to the source of the information . . . Grand Met. [Under the
traditional theory] the disclosure obligation . . . ran to those with
whom the misappropriator trades [the $4-million sellers].2 24
This highlights two major points: (1) The Duty in both theories is
To Disclose. That is, Deceit is forbidden. (2) In neither theory is the
Disclosure Duty said to be a Fiduciary Duty.
Yet elsewhere, the courts uniformly do refer to the Disclosure Duty
as Fiduciary. Thus:
In lieu of premising liability on a fiduciary relationship between a
company insider and purchaser or seller of the company's stock [as
in the traditional theory], the misappropriation theory premises liabil-
ity on a fiduciary-turned-trader's deception of those who entrusted
him with access to confidential information [i.e., the Source].225
With these two pronouncements, two prior principles, according to
O'Hagan, are clear: (1) Both theories hold that the Duty is both one of
Disclosure and Fiduciary, and (2) In the Traditional Theory the Fiduci-
224. Id. at 655 n.6 (emphasis added).
225. Id. at 652 (emphasis added).
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ary Disclosure Duty flowed from Insider to his Trader, and in the Mis-
appropriation Theory the Fiduciary Disclosure Duty flowed from the
'Insider,' now a Thief or Misappropriator, to the Source from whom he
stole the confidential information.
This summary picture explains the necessary division of the Intru-
sion of a Fiduciary Duty into two parts: (1) The Inexplicable Intrusion
of a 'Fiduciary Duty' into the Traditional Theory and (2) The Explicable
Intrusion of a 'Fiduciary Duty' into the Misappropriation Theory.
Interestingly, each intrusion is more remarkable than the other.
(1) The Inexplicable Intrusion of a 'Fiduciary Duty' into the
Traditional Theory
That title is inaccurate if the word 'inexplicable' is used literally.
As an expletive, however, it hits the mark. There is in truth a patent
explanation for the intrusion: Timorous Powell. The presence of 'fiduci-
ary duty' and 'fiduciary' in the Traditional Theory - and correspond-
ingly, eventually, in the Misappropriation Theory and O'Hagan - goes
back to his same two infamous opinions of the early 80s, the last
Supreme Court rulings on Insider Trading.226
Chiarella, Dirks and the 'Fiduciary' Genesis
Again comes the constant refrain: As with the bulk of the errors
afflicting the current law, Justice Powell and his twin opinions bear the
chief responsibility for this unexpected narrowing of Inside Traders to
fiduciaries and to no one else.
These pages have already told the story. The Justice so feared find-
ing fault with anyone that he abandoned outright all liability for the all-
encompassing "any person no matter who."
Did he perhaps fear the slightest interference with freedom to trade
on an open market, the 'free-market theory' espoused at the time by
academic Economists? More likely, he misunderstood the practical
exercise of the true Insider's Duty, thinking that Tom, Dick or Harry
would be burdened with a Herculean duty to disclose God-knows-what
every time he approached the trading floor.
For whatever reason, Justice Powell tightened the scope of culpa-
bility to this limited few: Only those "corporate insiders" who hence
are "trusted confidants" of the cheated trader. All the Vinnies, Milkens
and James Hermans would therefore be guiltless.
(Remember that these are O'Hagan conclusions as to what
226. Its 4-to-4 decision rendered Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19 (1987), adjudicatively
nugatory and all commentary correspondingly obiter.
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Chiarella said. But Chiarella itself was far, far less clear-cut. The
Chiarella Court wavered and wandered. "Chiarella and the Fiduciary
Fallacy" '227 tracked this vacillation thoroughly. Suffice for now, neces-
sarily, that this is the Ginsburg view of what Chiarella held.)
Nothing in the history of the law, from Strong v. Repide in 1909 to
Chiarella in 1980, had even an intimation of a fiduciary' or a fiduciary
duty.' These Powell accretions have resisted removal ever since.
The History of Section 10(b)
The painstaking study of 'Deceit,' both the Word and the Malefac-
tion, left the same conclusion: Nothing in the history of Section 10(b)
and its antecedents contained even a notion of a 'fiduciary relation.'
The overall judgment is curt: 'Fiduciary Duty' is a notion that
Chiarella inflicted in 1980 on the Traditional Theory. This Powell
affliction has acted on the law of Insider Trading as if a computer virus,
corrupting the simplest concepts and destroying memory in case after
case. Justice Ginsburg simply lacked the courage to attack the virus
directly.
The thought undoubtedly has arisen: Are these few paragraphs suf-
ficient to explain the speciousness of the insertion of a fiduciary' ele-
ment into the simple duty incumbent on everyone - "any person no
matter who" - to tell the truth to his fellow trader, to avoid deceiving
him? The answer is this:
The presence of a fiduciary duty' and a fiduciary relationship' of
the insider to his trading partner requires no lengthy explanation. (1)
The concepts began with Timorous Powell in Chiarella. They had no
other genesis or other rationale than his. No other Supreme Court opin-
ion has passed on them.
(2) The concepts have been in the law of Insider Trading only these
few years since the early eighties and have endured that long only
because later courts, bound by stare decisis, have unthinkingly mouthed
them.
That accounts for the brevity of this condemnation of the fiduci-
ary' in the traditional Insider Trade, antedating the advent of the next
wave of contamination by the Misappropriation Theory.
Justice Ginsburg, therefore, inherited the aberration engrafted on
the law of Cady, Roberts, Merrill Lynch and Texas Gulf Sulphur by
Chiarella and Mr. Justice Powell.
What Justice Ginsburg did with this sorry heritage is the second
half of the tale.
227. Bayne, 'Fiduciary' Fallacy, supra note 5.
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(2) The Explicable Intrusion of a 'Fiduciary Duty' into the
Misappropriation Theory
A summary history of the growth of an illogical thesis invariably
brings insights into the several elements constituting that thesis. This is
singularly true of the construction of the Misappropriation Theory and
its perplexing constituent: The burden on the Misappropriator of a Fidu-
ciary Duty owed to his Victim, him from whom the secrets were stolen.
How remarkable that the Thief must also be a trustee or a confidant of
him whom he thieved, or snooped.
The Ultimate Explanation
Go back into the minds of the Theorists when first they sat down to
concoct the Theory. Why did they even want or need a new theory?
They had seventy years of respectable success fighting Insider Trading,
first by means of common-law Deceit, and then with Section 10(b).
The answer to that question is patent: In 1980 Chiarella stopped the
sincere opponents of the scam in their tracks. The crooked Insider no
longer had a duty not to cheat his seller. Vinnie Chiarella went scot-
free.
So, instead of a continued frontal attack on Chiarella, the craven-
but-still-sincere Theorists decided to cook up a wholly different
approach. They decided to try to keep Section 10(b), but nonetheless
find their new tort embedded somewhere hitherto unseen.
(Others, more cynical, would callously maintain that the Theorists
were anything but craven, yet totally insincere. Their goal from the
beginning was to legalize insider trading, rationalizing it as a 'natural
and necessary process' in a free-market economy, as an aid to investors
in establishing realistic stock prices in an impersonal market. The legal
prohibitions of Section 10(b), they reasoned, could be finessed or
bypassed, given the erudite content of securities law in general, not to
mention the bar's and the trading public's general misunderstanding of
it. All A la Henry Manne.228)
This first decision by the Theorists to reinterpret Section 10(b) led
to the next vexing question: What form would this new version of Sec-
tion 10(b) take? What would the new Wrong be? Who the Victim? The
Malefactor? The Damages suffered?
The Concoction of the Tort
The new Tort was driven by negatives. Chiarella told the Theorists
228. HENRY G. MANNE, INSIDER TRADING AND THE STOCK MARKET (1966).
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that the Victim could no longer be the deceived Investor. The damages
could not be the Investor's losses. The wrong must be other than deceit
of an Investor. And certainly the malefactor could never be the con
artist of the past, because Vinnie was white as a driven lamb.
These negatives were not the only circumscriptions. Once the The-
orists opted to redesign Section 10(b), they inherited the confining
words of the code and Rule lOb-5. Therefore the tort must foremost
make "deception essential to the misappropriation theory"2 29 and "cen-
tral to liability. "230
But the Theorists also inherited that noted Powell aberration: The
Fiduciary Duty. It still burdened the Insider Trade. Therefore, with
Vinnie ruled innocent, on whom must the Fiduciary Duty fall?
The Chicken or the Egg?
From here on, who knows how the Theorists reasoned? Query if
even they could tell which of the circumscribing forces dictated which
pieces of the puzzle were first selected. Perhaps the analogy to a stew is
best. They threw all the Verbotens of Chiarella, and all the several man-
dates, together, stirred them and came up with the fantasy result, the
Theft of Information. But that bluntness sounded too foreign to Section
10(b) and Insider Trading, so the Theorists called it the Misappropria-
tion Theory.
In one stroke all the parts of the puzzle were thereby forced into
place. Since the wrong was Theft of secrets, the malefactor was neces-
sarily the Thief- now inferentially the 'Insider' - who was the person
who was snooping on his employer.
Correspondingly the injured one - the potential plaintiff in a tort
action - was he who was the Victim of the Theft, the principal or the
'Source' of the confidential information.
The damages, as the Theory spelt them out meticulously, were the
loss of a property right, so tangible as to be akin to money or goods,
namely, the right to the exclusive use of the information.
Into the Theory was also inserted the mandatory 'deceit,' so the
Thief has somehow deceived his source at some point in the process of
the thievery.
Finally the Theorists, at Powell's insistence, engrafted the
Chiarella Fiduciary aberration onto the nascent Theory. Henceforward,
the Thief must be also the trusted satellite of his Victim.
(That begins to explain the ill-fitting presence of a Fiduciary Duty
229. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 (emphasis added).
230. Id. at 654.
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burdening a Thief. Conversely, that also explains why all 'thieves of
information' who are not trusted confidants are not liable under Section
10(b)!)
Of all the elements of this m61ange, the presence of the Fiduciary
Duty is the sole immediate concern.
Harken Back to Willie 'Sutton'
The simple escapade of Willie 'Sutton,' and particularly the inti-
macy of his fiduciary' relationship to his bank - about as tenuous as
any other denizen of that little 'Wheat Capital of the World' would
have - were borrowed directly from the real-case scenario of Danny
Cherif, and his virtually nonexistent relationship with First Chicago. 2 31
Danny Cherif was, as was Willie 'Sutton,' an amateur bank robber.
Long before his heist Danny had done unspecified work in a research
department of First Chicago until he was 'downsized' in 1987. A year
later he falsified his way into the vaults, made off with secret, nonpublic
information and used it in a securities trade.232
Since the Second Circuit in Chestman found that Keith Loeb had
no fiduciary relation' with his own happily married wife, Susan,2 33
Danny Cherif could scarce be conceived to be a fiduciary' of his former
firm. Or could a second-teller like Willie 'Sutton.'
Even the Seventh Circuit adverted to its doubts about Danny's
fiduciary' status:
There has been some suggestion that Rule 1Ob-5 should apply
even to "mere" thieves. See Chiarella ... (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that any time information is acquired by an illegal act,
whether in breach of a fiduciary duty or not, there is a duty to dis-
close that information to the purchaser or seller with whom the
acquirer trades) .... 231
SEC v. Cherif remains one of the main Theory cases. And illus-
trates again the fragility of the intrusion of fiduciary' into what is plain
old 'Theft.' Or, in Cherif, into bank robbery.
As the final word, the eminent Judge Luttig put it best in Bryan:
Moreover, while the courts adopting the misappropriation theory
incant that the breach of a fiduciary relationship is a necessary ele-
ment of the offense, in principle, if not in reality, these courts would
be obliged to find liability in the case of simple theft by an employee,
even where no fiduciary duty has been breached, for the raison d'etre
231. SEC v. Cherif, 933 F.2d 403, 406-07 (7th Cir. 1991).
232. Id.
233. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 568.
234. Cherif, 933 F.2d at 412 n.6 (emphasis added).
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of the misappropriation theory in fact is concern over "the unfairness
inherent in trading on [stolen] information."'23
The grafting of a 'Trusted Thief' onto the Insider Trade of history
was the third violence inflicted by the Theory. The first was the absence
of the essential Insider. The second, the missing Deceit. Now, the
fourth.
IV. A FoREIGN VICTIM, WITHOUT A REMEDY
Recur to the Thesis of this Article:
That the Supreme Court in O'Hagan, (1) Abandoned all judicial
consideration of the tort of Insider Trading, and (2) Substituted an
ancient crime, Theft, in its place.
And then to the Subthesis:
Because each individual essential to an Insider Trade is lacking, the
totality of Insider Trading is, eo ipso, lacking.
The central concern of the Securities Acts - and hence Section
10(b) - has always been "the buying public - wholly unprotected from
the misuse of special information," as the SEC itself put it in 1961 in
Cady, Roberts.236 The Investor, as the Victim, is the foremost essential
of the Insider Trade.
The Investor as Victim Supplanted
This fourth of the Theory's contortions of the traditional Insider
Trade requires a two-pronged study: (1) The Victims, Before and After,
and (2) Two Wrongs, No Rights. Each prong of this study involves a
comparison of the Victim's status under both the Theory and the tradi-
tional law.
The Theory persists in its maltreatment of the Insider Trade by
eliminating both the Victim - the $4-million Investors are nowhere to
be found - and any Remedy for the aggrieved party under either the
Theory or its traditional predecessor.
(1) The Victims, Before and After
Even the chief Theory case, Chestman,237 admitted that the Victim
of the traditional Insider Trade had been eliminated, that now
[the Theory] is clearly beyond the pale of the traditional theory of
235. United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (emphasis added).
236. In re Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961).
237. United States v. Chestman, 947 F.2d 551 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 1004
(1992).
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insider trading.238
More remarkably, Chestman openly stated that the misappropriation
Theory had abandoned the past, that
[N]one of the prongs of liability under the traditional theory
applied.239
O'Hagan followed Chestman and juxtaposed the 'victims before
and after' in one summary paragraph. Here the $4-million Investors are
banished. Grand Met is now the Victim:
Under the misappropriation theory.. ., the disclosure obligation
runs to the source of the information . . . Grand Met. [Under the
traditional theory] the disclosure obligation . . . ran to those with
whom the misappropriator trades [the $4-million sellers].24°
Chestman, as a presage of Justice Ginsburg, explained this sharp
disparity between the Victim before and after:
[T]he predicate act of fraud may be perpetrated on the source of the
nonpublic information, even though the source may be unaffiliated
with the buyer or seller of securities.2 4 '
The switching of Victims was abrupt and wrenching. Now, no
thought for the conned $4-million Investors. Now, all solicitude for
Grand Met, wounded by the Theft of its secret.
(2) Two Wrongs, No Rights
But the consequences of the substitution of Grand Met for the $4-
million Investors were more tangible and more poignant. With the
change of Victims came a total change of the Wrongs suffered by the
Victims and the legal Remedies available to right those Wrongs. Their
differences were notable.
The Recovery of Damages: 1909-1980
For seventy years - from the Supreme Court's Strong v. Repide42
in 1909 to Powell's Chiarella - an individual Investor cheated in an
Insider Trade could bring an individual action for dollars lost against the
Insider himself. A civil recovery was routine. Witness Mrs. Strong's
success against con man Repide, the Widdie Hotchkiss's recovery
against her lying buyer in 1932, Mr. Shapiro's personal action against
238. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 567.
239. Id.
240. O'Hagan, 521 U.S. at 655 n.6 (emphasis added). As corroborative, see id. at 2207.
241. Chestman, 947 F.2d at 566.
242. 213 U.S. 419 (1909).
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Merrill Lynch affirmed by the Second Circuit in 1974.243
The End of Personal Recoveries: 1980-
But in 1980 those halcyon days ended with a muffled thud - "not
with a bang, but a whimper ' 244 - with Chiarella and its putative anti-
dote, the Misappropriation Theory. Now the Victim to be protected is
Grand Met. Its injury? Theft of Information.
The Mother of All Anomalies: The Theory Victim Has No Standing
The Theft of Information is a Section-10(b) tort. As such, it is gov-
erned by the long-encrusted Birnbaum Rule of 1952.24 For thirty
years - as the Theorists knew full well in the eighties - the Supreme
Court canonized that Birnbaum Rule in Blue Chip Stamps.24 6 As the
Journal reported on Blue Chip:
[O]nly stock-fraud victims who have actually bought or sold securi-
ties can sue for damages growing out of the transactions.247
Thus, by the Theory definition, no Victim will ever bring an indi-
vidual action. This sole Victim under the theory should have a cause of
action but the victim of a theft has no standing under Section 10(b). The
Securities laws were not designed to protect the Grand Mets. Hence the
total absence of a private Theory plaintiff in the history of the Misap-
propriation Theory.
All Investor Recovery Precluded
And the practicalities of legal life bear out a second alarming truth.
Not one Theory case, not one, including O'Hagan, has seen a single
conned Investor bring a personal action for damages suffered for Insider
Trading. As "Chestman and the Misappropriation Theory" said:
Thus, in the long litany of 'misappropriation' cases, the unvary-
ing presence of the Government or the SEC as plaintiff is no accident.
At first Rothberg appeared to be an exception. But it involved a col-
lateral defense in a contract action. No Theory case has yet to afford
compensatory damages to anyone. The Theory fails completely
when the remedy is reached. Section 10(b) has been emasculated.248
243. See Bayne, Chestman, supra note 5, at 90-93,113-19 (discussing Strong v. Repide,
Hotchkiss v. Fischer, Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.).
244. T.S. ELIOT, THE WASTELAND (1922).
245. See Birnbaum v. Newport Steel Corp., 193 F.2d 461 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 956
(1952).
246. Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
247. Wayne E. Green, Supreme Court Limits Antifraud Suits to Actual Buyers or Sellers of
Securities, WALL ST. J., June 10, 1975, at 6 (commenting on the Manor Drug holding).
248. Bayne, Chestman, supra note 5, at 154 (citing Rothberg v. Rosenbloom, 771 F.2d 818 (3d
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1017 (1987)).
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Consider the 'big three' Theory cases: United States v. Chestman,
SEC v. Clark, SEC v. Cherif All are government plaintiffs. And lesser
lights: Newman, Materia, Carpenter, Musella, Tome, Reed, Willis.
Either the United States or the SEC.
Under the Misappropriation Theory, the legal world must now rely
on the Government personally for all redress. Whether for Grand Met,
the Victim of Theft, or the $4-million Investors, the Victim of a scam,
Section 10(b) has been hamstrung. The Theory version of Section 10(b)
gives no standing for a private action by anyone. Big Brother watches
over all.
Under the traditional theory, Chiarella gave the Vinnies, Milkens,
James Hermans, a free pass. Their duped Investors were denied relief.
And the Theory has no remedy for any of them.
So, in the end, the Theory gives recovery to no one. Not to the
victims of the theft. Or the investing public.249
This fourth essential, the true Victim, "the buying public - wholly
unprotected," is absent from the Insider Trade. Even the Victim of the
Theft has no real cause of action.
V. 'THEFT OF INFORMATION' VIS-A-VIS INSIDER TRADING
Recur to the Thesis of this Article:
That the Supreme Court in O'Hagan, (1) Abandoned all judicial
consideration of the tort of Insider Trading, and (2) Substituted an
ancient crime, Theft, in its place.
Each of the four substantive essentials of the Insider Trade nave
now been diligently sought in the pages of Ginsburg's O'Hagan. They
were nowhere to be found. Further commentary would pall.
A graphic presentation of the substantive essentials of the tradi-
tional Section-10(b) tort of Insider Trading juxtaposed against the The-
ory's new version should recall the extent to which the Thesis of this
Article has been proven.
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EPILOGUE
This Article completes the second of a two-part Study of O'Hagan,
the lates cnry, tht word on the law of Insider Trading and the first
since the ill-advised Chiarella.
Thefirst half of this two-part Study - "Insider Trading: The Mis-
appropriation Theory Ignored: Ginsburg's O'Hagan.'' 2s° - in its analy-
sis of the transformation of the Insider Trade to a Theft of Information,
reached an unsettling conclusion: That the Supreme Court never judi-
cially faced the question before it: Does the Misappropriation Theory
conform to Section 1O(b)?
To the contrary, that Article found "that Justice Ginsburg and the
Majority disported themselves in a lengthy obiter disquisition on 'a
novel New Theory.n"" But finessed the Misappropriation Theory
itself.
Now, with O'Hagan shorn of all adjudicative content on Insider
Trading itself - and the Misappropriation Theory gone as well -
O'Hagan is indeed denuded.
The remaining obiter reflections of the Court can serve only as
stimuli to a frontal attack on Chiarella. Or at least a typical gradual
erosion.
The forceful dissent of Justice Thomas supported by the Chief and
Justice Scalia, the wavering of Justice Souter, the rumored retirement of
Justice Stevens and a latterly hobbled President, all give promise of
imminent success.
250. Bayne, Misappropriation Theory Ignored, supra note 1.
251. Id.
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